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Abstract
Motivated by some real problems, our thesis puts forward two general two-period pricing
models and explore optimal buying and selling strategies in two states of the two-period de-
cision, when buyer/seller’s decisions in the two periods are uncertain: commodity valuations
may or may not be independent, may or may not follow the same distribution, be heavily or
just lightly influenced by exogenous economic conditions, and so on. For both the example
of buying laptops and the example of selling houses, the connections between each example
and the two-envelope paradox encourage us to explore optimal strategies based on the works of
McDonnell and Abbott (2009) and McDonnell et al. (2011), which proposed optimal strategies
on the condition that the amount of the first envelope is known. In the case of buying laptop
whether on Black Friday, or on Boxing day, We derive an optimal strategy for minimizing the
expected loss in the two-period economy when a pivotal decision needs to be made during
the first time-period and cannot be subsequently reversed. In the cases of selling real estate in
Punta del Este, a resort town in Uruguay, real-estate property is in demand by both domestic
and foreign buyers. There are several stages of selling residential units: before, during, and
after the actual construction. Different pricing strategies are used at every stage. We propose
a general model to derive, under various scenarios of practical relevance, optimal strategies
for setting prices within two-stage selling framework, as well as to explore the optimal timing
for accomplishing these tasks in order to maximize the overall seller’s expected revenue. The
optimal strategies in this model draw hints from the example of selling real estate proposed by
Egozcue et al. (2013), where the ideas of McDonnell and Abbott (2009) and McDonnell et al.
(2011) were applied in two states of the one-period decision scenario. All our optimal buy-
ing/selling strategies are illustrated with numerical and graphical examples using appropriately
constructed parametric models.
Keywords: Decision theory; two-period economy; price discrimination; strategy; game
theory; conditional probability; statistical modelling; behavioral economics; uncertainty; back-
ground risk model; gamma distribution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Optimal strategies and decisions in two-period economies are important and popular in decision
making and economic analysis. Naturally, in a two-period model, the first period is the current
period (or today) and the second period represents the latter period (the future, or tomorrow).
These kinds of studies cover domains of economic problems including the consumer’s prob-
lems, the producer’s problems, and general equilibrium models (Chiang, 1984; Daher et al.,
2014; Farmer, 1993; Grossmann and Dietl, 2009; Hlouskova et al., 2017; Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1996; Rabitsch and Stepanchuk, 2014).
We are now focusing on decision-making theory frameworks to exploring optimal decision-
making strategies which balance the trade-off between the benefits in the present (current pe-
riod) and the benefits in the future (next period). The vast majority of these kinds of studies are
of these types:
• the buying decisions which consider buying today at current prices or waiting until next
period;
• the selling decisions which consider selling today at current prices or waiting until next
period.
Incorporating time dimensions into decision making and economic analysis, we construct
a two-period framework of optimal decision-making strategies to understand inter-temporal
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choices and dynamic decision-making issues. The generalization to multiple periods is straight-
forward: if the two-period framework is constructed, then we can consider a three-period
framework as a initial stage connecting the rest stage, which is also a two-period framework;
so continue, until you can consider all multistage framework into the two-period framework.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.1, we review the analyses of
optimal decision strategies in two states of the one-period scenario. Among these analyses, the
strategies suggested by McDonnell and Abbott (2009) and McDonnell et al. (2011) are attrac-
tive and very different. Based on the review of exploring optimal decision strategies in two
states of the one-period scenario, we describe optimal decision problems in two states of the
two-period scenario in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 gives an overview of the structure introduction
of the whole thesis.
1.1 Optimal decision strategies in two states of the one-period
scenario
Among vast amount of optimal strategies and decision theories with two states of the one-
period scenario, McDonnell and Abbott (2009) proposed novel strategies and decision theories
based on their solution of the famous “two-envelope” paradox 1.
Most of the solutions to the “two-envelope” paradox indicate temporal strategies when
making decisions that maximize the payoff (Albers et al., 2005). McDonnell and Abbott (2009)
and McDonnell et al. (2011) proposed new strategy that can enable a player to beat the game
regarding increasing their payoff. The strategies could be applied to optimize gains of buy-
ing strategies of consumers economic behavior, gains of selling strategies of firms theory of
economics, financial investments and so on.
Generally, in a standard two-envelope paradox, a player has to choose one of two envelopes,
1The “two-envelope” paradox attracts wide interest, because it impacts on various fields such as game theory,
probability theory, economic theory, and decision theory (Langtree, 2004).
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and therefore keep the money in it — one of them contains twice as much money as the other
one. Key points in the following strategies are
• if the player opens one envelope they choose, then he/she cannot choose the other one
any more;
• or he/she swaps envelopes, and therefore keeps the money in the other one.
Thus, indeed, everyone including the player knows the other envelope has either twice the
money or half the money as the former one. The player needs to make a wise decision even
though he/she does not know which is which in the initial period.
In a strategy without many careful considerations, since a player has a 50-50 chance of
choosing either envelope, he/she has an equal chance of gaining or losing money. It doesn’t
matter whether he/she decides to swap or keep the original envelope. However, a little bit more
mathematical calculations may indicate that it is always better to swap based on probability
theory (Falk, 2008).
Furthermore, McDonnell and Abbott (2009) and McDonnell et al. (2011) developed more
novel and different strategies for the “two-envelope” paradox. Their strategies followed Cover’s
switching function, which are,
• on the one hand, people want envelopes when the observed amount is a large sum of
money;
• on the other hand, people want to swap with greater likelihood if the initial observed
amount is small.
Cover’s proposal is that the probability of switching should be some monotonically decreasing
function of the observed amount. Based on these results, the strategy of McDonnell and Abbott
(2009, 2011) discovered — whether the player should swap the envelopes or not depends on
that the observed amount is large or not in the current period.
The strategies suggested by McDonnell and Abbott (2009, 2011) can be applied compre-
hensively in many fields. As an application in real estate, Egozcue et. al. (2013) put forward
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a model and then derived an optimal strategy that maximizes the expected real-estate selling
price when one of the only two remaining buyers had already made an offer, but the other one
had yet to make an offer. The strategies of McDonnell and Abbott (2009, 2011) provided pretty
useful hints for optimal real-estate sellers strategies. When selling a house, the seller can not
make sure whether the other buyer would make a lower or higher offer than the first-come (cur-
rent) buyer. Indeed, the seller needs optimal strategies to decide whether to accept or to reject
the first-come offer. By a connection between the motivating problem and the two-envelope
problem, Egozcue et. al. (2013) derived an optimal sellers strategy, which is used to maximize
the expected selling price based on the contributions of McDonnell and Abbott (2009, 2011)
from the seller’s perspective.
1.2 Optimal decision strategies in two states of the two-period
scenario
When it comes to optimal decision strategies in two states of the two-period scenario based on
the optimal decision strategies in two states of the one-period scenario, at least the following
three different pieces of information have to be considered:
• the trade-off between temporal decision and the decision in latter period;
• the impact of current decisions on decisions of next period;
• the effect of time between two terms on random variables of the latter period.
In our real life, many things that people encounter in daily life related to two states of the
two-period decisions would also pose an increasing practical demand for optimal strategies and
decision making.
For example, here is a case from the real life. The author had an urgent need to buy a
laptop in a very soon coming period, for example, in one or two months of rationality and he
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was looking for a good deal online. Due to the advantages of online shopping, he got much
information about the price of the particular type of Lenovo laptop, such as T540, very quickly.
He knew that, in coming two months, the price of T540 would fluctuate for many reasons, and
two important promotions among those reasons are more attractive, Black Friday promotion,
from November 27th, 2015, to December 3th, 2015, and Boxing day promotion, from December
26th, 2015, to January 3th, 2016. Based on that, his buying strategy was to get a better choice
among the two promotions.
Obviously, because of the promotion, it was prudent to buy the laptop during the Black
Friday promotion period, with the discounted price of 1,431.01 Canadian dollars for the laptop.
However, it was not easy to justify at that moment whether he wanted to buy the laptop at that
price or wait until the Boxing Day promotion. Can there be a good buying strategy for making
good decisions during the Black Friday promotion period?
The above example of buying the laptop here raises a practical demand for optimal buying
strategies in two states of the two-period decisions from the buyers’ perspective. Furthermore,
sometimes we can also observe the demand for optimal selling strategies in two states of the
two-period decisions from the sellers’ perspective. The real estate example below proposes a
real need for optimal selling strategies when selling houses.
Namely, in Punta del Este, a resort town in Uruguay, the real-estate property is in demand
by both domestic and foreigner buyers. As a recent example, the distribution of buyers for a
certain high-rise building were 10% Uruguayans, 75% Argentineans, 10% Brazilians, and the
remaining 5% were from the rest of the world (Chile, U.S.A., and so on). Naturally, the ratio
of domestic and foreign buyers varies and depends on many factors, such as economic and
financial. We also assume that the average foreign buyer is wealthier than the domestic one,
and thus tends to exhibit a higher bidding price. Furthermore, it is important to note that given
the diversity of buyers, the prices are usually in US dollars (USD), but some of the building
costs such as salaries of workers are in Uruguayan pesos (UYU).
Suppose now that, contracted by an investor, a construction company is in the process of
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building a high-rise apartment building. There are various stages of selling apartments: before,
during, and after the actual construction of the building. Different pricing strategies are used
at every stage. For the sake of concreteness, we only deal with the case when the building
has already been built, but some units are still to be sold. Suppose that, initially, the investor
wishes to sell the units en masse and thus hires a real estate agent for several months. If the
sale turns out to be unsuccessful during the initial selling stage, then the units would be put
on sale individually, with no particular time horizon set in advance and at a possibly different
(higher or lower) price. For the property investor, the task is to set a proper price for the initial
selling stage, and also another price, usually different from the original price, for higher profit.
Can there be a good selling strategy for making good decisions during initial period from the
seller’s perspective?
1.3 Overview
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce all the fundamental
notions and techniques used throughout the thesis. The starting point of the logic of this the-
sis is “the two-envelope paradox”, which is described in Section 2.1.1. In Section 2.1.2, the
varies of solutions of the two-envelope paradox are briefly concluded. Among many valuable
solutions, McDonnell and Abbott (2009) proposed a wise strategy which is demonstrated in
Section 2.1.3. Also, all three particular cases of the strategy of McDonnell and Abbott (2009)
are illustrated in Section 2.1.4. Proposition 2.1.1 expresses clearly the strategy — it is optimal
to switch and complementary intervals where no-switching is the optimal strategy.
As an application of the strategies of McDonnell and Abbott (2009) and McDonnell et al.
(2011), Section 2.1.5 shows us an example of real-estate sale, which is analyzed in Egozcue et
al. (2013). Egozcue et al. (2013) solved the maximization problem of “strategy risk parameter”
described in the Proposition 2.1.2 as abstract of the logic of real-estate selling. And, in turn,
Proposition 2.1.3 solve the maximizing strategy function which is described in Proposition
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2.1.2 and Proposition 2.1.4 proposed a threshold-type strategy.
In Chapter 3, we propose an optimal strategy to minimize the expected buying price from
the buyer’s perspective in a two-period scenario. The story in this chapter is realistic. When
one of the authors need to buy a laptop in the Fall of 2015, it was prudent, but difficult, for
the author to buy during the former period — the Black Friday promotion period. The Section
3.1 describes the motivation problem from the buyer’s perspective. In Section 3.2, the optimal
strategy, which minimizes the expected buying price with no attempts to guess the possible
price to be offered during the second time-period, is shown in Theorem 3.2.1. As a natural
extended part of Theorem 3.2.1, the optimal strategy, which minimizes the expected buying
price with guessed price to be offered during the second time-period, is shown in Theorem
3.2.2. When specifying the detailed information in the proposed purchase laptop problems, the
behaviors of the salespersons L and H, who are defined in Section 3.2, are depicted by two
independent random variables and their distribution fXL,XH (x, y). Section 3.3 models the joint
distribution fXL,XH (x, y) through both the characters of the behaviors of the salespersons L and
H and the influences of the company’s marketing team or management. The probability that
the salesperson L makes an offer during the first time-period given that the prices provided by
L and H are x and y, respectively, is p(x, y), which is described in Section 3.4. Because of the
characters of the two-period economies, the theory of the third-degree price discrimination is
applied to shape p(x, y) in the monopolistic competitive market. Theorem 3.2.1 and Theorem
3.2.2 are proved in Section 3.5 as a somehow conclusion of Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4, we propose an optimal strategy from the seller’s perspective which maxi-
mizes the overall seller’s expected revenue. Especially we set first- and second-stage prices to
maximize the overall seller’s expected revenue under various scenarios of practical relevance
in a two-period scenario. In Section 4.1, we show a motivation problem of selling real-estate
property in Punta del Este, a resort town in Uruguay in the introduction part of Subsection
4.1.1. Following the introduction part, some basic results and findings of solving the moti-
vation problem are concisely concluded in Subsection 4.1.2. Subsection 4.1.3 reviews some
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pieces of literature related to the motivation problem, and its solutions.
In Section 4.2 we present several illustrative examples that clarify certain key aspects of our
general model, which will be proposed in Section 4.3. These aspects are described as sequential
and simultaneous price settings, differing valuations and thus bid prices, costs associated with
holding unsold property. The differences of four kinds of scenarios between setting the two
prices sequentially and simultaneously are shown by numerical 4 tables, Tables 4.1 – 4.4, and
16 graphs, Figures 4.2 – 4.17 in Subsection 4.2.2 . These different cases of 4 scenarios show
how many considerations influence the two prices in a two-period scenario.
When the second period, T , is pre-specified and thus deterministic, this kind of examples
were discussed in Wu and Zitikis (2017). When the second period, T , is generally unknown
and thus treated as a random variable, it is the general case that is considered as the general
model proposed in Section 4.3.
In order to figure out the ideas of the general model, a number of other simplifying yet
practically sound assumptions are made to simplify the technicalities in the general model.
Section 4.4 and Section 4.5. In Section 4.4 we analyze the initial-stage selling probability.
We concentrate on the forces that give rise to the amount of money that the buyer (domestic or
foreign) is willing to pay for the property during the initial selling stage. Subsection 4.4.1 takes
into account individual considerations detached both from the exogenous factors and various
exogenous factors to describe the initial-stage selling probability. These the exogenous factors
and various exogenous factors are modeled by some proper gamma distributions in Subsection
4.4.2.
The second-stage selling possibility is explored in Section 4.5. Very similar to the first
stage, we take into account individual considerations detached both from the exogenous factors
and various exogenous factors to describe the second-stage selling conditional probability in
Subsection 4.5.1. The exogenous factors and various exogenous factors are modeled by some
proper gamma distributions in Subsection 4.5.2. In Section 4.6 we discuss modeling initial-
and second-stage value functions and then use them to illustrate our general model through
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some figures numerically (See Figures 4.18-4.21).
In Chapter 5, the conclusions of the whole theses are given in Section 5.1 and remaining
open questions and future works are proposed in Section 5.2.
Chapter 2
Fundamental notions and the techniques
2.1 Two-envelope paradox and its resolutions
2.1.1 Two-envelope paradox
The two-envelope paradox, also known as the two-envelope problem, is a paradox in logic,
game theory, decision theory, probability, and mathematics. Sometimes this problem goes
to be very paradoxical, if you are not careful with your analysis. The problem typically is
expressed by a theoretical problem of the following descriptions.
Suppose you are playing a game for money, and you are given two indistinguishable en-
velopes. One containing some money, say $x, the other one contains twice, say $2x. But you
don’t know which one is which. Initially, you can pick one of the two envelopes and keep the
amount it contains, say $v. Before opening it, you are offered a chance to swap envelopes to
get more money (of course, if your guessing is wrong, then you would get less money). A
question is “should you swap the envelopes or not”?
Obviously swapping the envelopes or not depends on comparison of the value without
swapping envelopes and the expected returns with swapping envelopes. Suppose the player
has a 50-50 chance of choosing either envelope at this moment, and therefore he/she has an
equal chance of gaining or losing money. After a few steps of calculations, it is not difficult to
10
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understand
• if he/she doesn’t swap, he/she get $v;
• if he/she swaps, he/she get
1
2
(v/2) +
1
2
(2v) [=
5
4
v > v].
The results would mean we expect to gain 54v on average based on swapping the envelopes.
It gives you some hints that it doesn’t matter which envelope you choose initially — you should
always swap.
Indeed, besides the above example, there are many other versions of the two-envelope
paradox. The beginning of the two-envelope paradox started from necktie paradox (Kraitchik,
1930) and wallet game (Gardner, 1982). A more popular version of the two-envelope paradox
was constructed by Zabell (1988).
There is a body of work related to the two-envelope paradox since the logic of the two-
envelope paradox is widely existing in the fields of game theory, probability theory, and deci-
sion theory. What’s more, when problems of random switching between two unstable states are
involved in a study, the two-envelope paradox can be applied to these problems frequently in
fields of physics, engineering and economics (Abbott, 2009; Allison & Abbott, 2001; Harmer
& Abbott, 1999a, 1999b, 2002).
2.1.2 Exploiting for resolutions of the two-envelope paradox
There are plentiful of resolutions to the two-envelope paradox, but many researchers insist that
most of them are meaningless because of the lack of consensus (Christensen & Utts, 1992;
McGrew et al., 1997; Castell & Batens, 1994; Clark & Shackel, 2000; Meacham & Weisberg,
2003). As a result, the two-envelope paradox is widely considered as an opening problem
(Albers et al., 2005).
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Among these abundant studies of finding the solutions of the two-envelope paradox, there is
one type of the two-envelope paradox — where the player observes the amount in one envelope
and keeps the amount of the other one unknown for exploiting (Nalebuff, 1989; Nickerson
and Falk, 2006). Following the idea that observing the amount in the first selected envelope,
the player swaps to the second envelope with a probability. Mcdonnell and Abbott (2009)
demonstrated a wise strategy for dealing with the two-envelope paradox. The smart strategy
shows
• to swap envelopes with less likelihood when the observed amount is a large sum of
money;
• to swap envelopes with more likelihood when the observed amount is small.
2.1.3 Problem formulation
Suppose there are two indistinguishable envelopes, the amounts of which are x and 2x respec-
tively. Let random variable X defined on (Ω,F ,P) be the amount of the first envelope opened
by the player with probabilities P(X = x) = p and P(X = 2x) = 1 − p. Then the switching
probabilities given the amount X = x are PS (x) and PS (2x) respectively, where 0 ≤ PS (x) ≤ 1
for all x > 0. Hence, the probability that the player ends the trial with amount x is
Px(x) = p (1 − PS (x)) + (1 − p)PS (2x),
and the probability that the player ends with amount 2x is
P2x(x) = pPS (x) + (1 − p) (1 − PS (2x)) .
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Thus, the unconditional expected return given X = x is
R(x) = x · Px(x) + 2x · P2x(x)
= x · p (1 − PS (x)) + (1 − p)PS (2x) + 2x · pPS (x) + (1 − p) (1 − PS (2x))
= x(2 − p) + p(x(PS (x) + PS (2x)) − xPS (2x)),
where x > 0. Assuming the density function of X is fX(x), then the unconditional expected
return is
R =
∫ ∞
0
fX(x)R(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
fX(x)(x(2 − p) + p(x(PS (x) + PS (2x)) − xPS (2x)))dx
= (2 − p)E[X] +
∫ ∞
0
fX(x)p(x(PS (x) + PS (2x)) − xPS (2x))dx. (2.1)
Here a natural benchmark strategy could be defined as “never switching”, which is equivalent to
PS (x) ≡ 0 for all x > 0. Then accordingly, the unconditional expected return of the benchmark
strategy is
RB := (2 − p)E[X].
Therefore, the gain or loss due to certain switching strategy PS is
S := R − RB =
∫ ∞
0
x fX(x)
[
pPS (x) − (1 − p)PS (2x)] dx. (2.2)
Clearly, to maximize the gain S, the player should determine the switching region depending
on PS . And such a switching region could be written as {x ∈ [0,∞) : s(x) > 0}, where
s(x) = pPS (x) − (1 − p)PS (2x). (2.3)
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2.1.4 McDonnell and Abbott (2009): three particular cases
It might be very difficult to obtain the optimal function PS through maximizing S directly.
However, if the form of function as well as certain parameters is given, it is possible to obtain
the required switching region. In McDonnell and Abbott (2009), three particular cases for
function PS are given to illustrate the derivation of the switching region from PS .
(i). Constant switching probability
Let the switching probability PS (x) be a constant with respect to x, namely, PS (x) ≡ q
for all x > 0. Then by (2.2) we have
S = q(2p − 1)E[X].
Hence, there are three cases for decision-making:
• If p = 0.5, then S = 0, which means that there are neither gain nor loss for the
unconditional expected return regardless of the player’s decision.
• If p < 0.5, then S ≤ 0 and the equality holds if and only if q = 0. Notice that
q = 0 corresponds to the benchmark strategy. We may conclude that the benchmark
strategy is the optimal one among all strategies under this situation, i.e. the player
should not switch no matter what value of x he/she observed when openning the
first envelope.
• If p > 0.5, then S ∈ [0, (2p − 1)E[X]] and is maximized at q = 1. Thus, we may
conclude that the player should always choose to switch no matter what value of x
he/she observed when openning the first envelope.
(ii). Switching with smoothly decreasing probability
Suppose that PS (x) is a monotonically continuously decreasing function of x > 0. A
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particular case of this situation is that PS (x) decays exponentially, namely,
PS 1(x) = e
−ax, x > 0
for some a > 0.
Definition 2.1.1 The logit of a number p ∈ [0, 1] is given by the formula
logit(p) = log(
p
1 − p )
= log(p) − log(1 − p).
Hence, change envelope everywhere we have from (2.3) that the switching region is
{x ≥ 0 : x > c1} where
c1 = max
{
−1
a
logit(p), 0
}
.
This result indicates that as long as p ≥ 0.5, the player should always choose to switch
no matter what value of x he/she observed when opening the first envelope. Similar cases
include the switching probability
PS 2(x) =
2
1 + ea1 x
, x > 0
for some a1 > 0. Hence we have from (2.3) that the switching region is {x ≥ 0 : x > c2}
where
c2 =
1
a1
log
1 + √1 + 4y(1 − y)2y
 ,
where y = min{p/(1 − p), 1}. This result also indicates that as long as p ≥ 0.5, the
player should always choose to switch no matter what value of x he/she observed when
openning the first envelope.
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Definition 2.1.2 sech function, also known as Hyperbolic secant function, is defined by
sech(x) =
2
ex + e−x
for x ∈ R.
The last case we would like to discuss is
PS 3(x) = sech(a2x), x > 0
for some a2 > 0.
Definition 2.1.3 cosh function, also known as Hyperbolic cosine function, is defined by
cosh(x) = cos(ix)
for x ∈ R, and i is the imaginary unit which satisfies i2 = 1.
Hence we have from (2.3) that the switching region is {x ≥ 0 : x > c3} where
c3 =
1
a2
cosh−1
(
1 +
√
1 + 8z
4z
)
,
where z = min{p/(1 − p), 1}. And the same conclustion that when p ≥ 0.5 the player
should always choose to switch no matter what value of x he/she observed when opening
the first envelope could be obtained again.
(iii). Switching according to a threshold value
For this case, the switching probability could always be written as
PS 4(x) = 1{x≤b}, x > 0
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for some b > 0, where 1{·} is the indicator function. Then according to (2.3), we have
s(x) =

2p − 1 if x ≤ 0.5b,
p if 0.5b < x ≤ b,
0 if x > b.
Thus, the switching region should be {x ≥ 0 : c4 < x ≤ b} where c4 = 0.5b1{p<0.5}.
Notice that when x > b there are neither gain nor loss for the unconditional expected
return regardless of the player’s decision. As a result, when p ≥ 0.5, the player could
choose to switch no matter what value of x he/she observed when openning the first
envelope.
In McDonnell et al. (2011), the suboptimality of PS is discussed as the ‘non-blind’ two-
envelope problem. Notice that from (2.2) we may derive that
S :=
∫ ∞
0
yPS (y)g(y)dy,
where
g(y) := p fX(y) − 1 − p4 fX
(y
2
)
.
Hence the following result holds.
Proposition 2.1.1 (McDonnell et al. 2011, Theorem 2.4) The optimal switching function P∗S (y)
for the ‘non-blind’ two-envelope problem is
P∗S (y) = 1{g(y)≥0}.
This result indicates that there will be intervals of y for which it is optimal to switch and
complementary intervals where no-switching is the optimal strategy.
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2.1.5 Egozcue et al. (2013): applications to real-estate selling
An example of applying the two-envelope framework on other types of decision-making prob-
lems is considered in Egozcue et al. (2013). In that article, the seller of the house has to decide
between a current offer and a potential next offer (the seller will not wait for the third offer for
some reasons, for instance, he/she has a new position starting very soon in another city). In
this situation, the seller either accepts the current offer or rejects it, which means he/she has to
accept the next one no matter what price is offered. The main purpose of the article is to help
the seller make the decision based on the price of the current offer.
This problem is similar to a generalized version of the standard two-envelope problem. If
we consider the two offers as the two envelopes. Then the offered prices could be seen as the
rewards contained in the envelopes which are denoted as XH and XL respectively. Moreover,
XH represents the potentially higher price compared with XL. When the seller looks at the price
of the current offer, it is similar to that the seller opens one of the envelopes and sees the reward
in that envelope, however, he/she has no idea whether the amount stands for the higher one.
Thus, the framework of the two-envelope problem is a suitable tool for analyzing this situation.
The problem formulation is as follows. Suppose binary random variable Π1 ∈ {L,H} repre-
sents the person who comes first to put an offer. As the seller sees the price, his/her decision is
also a binary random variable ∆1 ∈ {A,R}. ∆1 = R means reject the current offer while ∆1 = A
means acceptance. Then the seller’s strategy function is
S (y) ≡ P [∆1 = R|XΠ1 = y]
based on the price of the current offer given the following two assumptions:
1. Whether the first-come offer Π1 is made by L or H does not depend on the (random)
prices XL and XH. This assumption allows us to denote
p ≡ P [Π1 = L] = P [Π1 = L|XL, XH]
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and thus P [Π1 = H] = 1 − p.
2. The probability of rejecting the current offer depends only on the amount of the current
offer.
Similar to the discussion in McDonnell and Abbott (2009), a benchmark expected price is
defined as the unconditional expected value of the price at deal when the seller always accepts
the current offer, i.e. S (y) ≡ 0. Hence the benchmark expected price is
BEP = pE [XL] + (1 − p) [XH] ,
which is equivalent to RB in McDonnell and Abbott (2009). Hence if the unconditional ex-
pected price given that some strategy S (y) is adopted is denote as µX, the following result is
given by Egozcue et al. (2013).
Proposition 2.1.2 (Theorem 2.1, Egozcue et al., 2013) The difference of µX and BEP is
µX − BEP = pE [S (XL) {E [XH |XL] − XL}] + (1 − p)E [S (XH) {E [XL|XH] − XH}] .
And this difference is called “strategy risk parameter” and denoted as SRP(S ) given the strat-
egy S .
Proposition 2.1.2 reduces the main purpose to the following maximization problem:
max
S
SRP(S ) (2.4)
subject to 0 ≤ S (y) ≤ 1 for all y ∈ [0,∞). This maximization problem could be solved through
the following result.
Proposition 2.1.3 (Corollary 3.1, Egozcue et al., 2013) Assume that XL and XH have densities
fL and fH, respectively. Then the maximizing strategy function SMAX(y) is the indicator 1A(y)
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of the set A = {x ∈ [0,∞) : HMAX(x) > 0}, where
HMAX(x) = p {E [XH |XL = x] − x} fL(x) + (1 − p) {E [XL|XH = x] − x} fH(x).
According to the appendix of McDonnell et al. (2011), Proposition 2.1.3 is expected to be
proved in at least three ways. However, as we could write SRP(S ) as
SRP(S ) =
∫
S (x)HMAX(x)dx,
it is clear that if SRP(S ) is supposed to be maximized S (x) has to be equal to 1 whenHMAX(x) >
0 while S (x) has to be equal to 0 whenHMAX(x) ≤ 0 intuitively.
Egozcue et al. (2013) claims that the ultimate maximizing strategy SMAX(y) is often a
threshold-type strategy, namely, S b(y) = 1[0,b)(y), where b ≥ 0 is a “threshold”. Two situations
are discussed in that article to illustrate this intuition, of which the first situation is when random
variables XL and XH are independent. In this situation, the functionHMAX(x) reduces to
HMAX(x) = p {E [XH] − x} fL(x) + (1 − p) {E [XL] − x} fH(x).
Moreover, it is assumed that XH is greater than or equal to XL in the likelihood ratio sense,
namely,
w(x) =
fH(x)
fL(x)
is a non-decreasing function with respect to x (this is the reason why subscript H is used to
stand for potentially “higher” price while subscript L stands for potentially “lower” price).
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Notice that
µH : = E [XH]
= E [XLw (XL)]
= Cov (XL,w (XL)) + E [XL] ,
it is easy to verify that µH ≥ µL := E [XL] due to that w(x) is non-decreasing. Thus, if XL and
XH have the same support (x1, x2) for some 0 ≤ x1 < x2 ≤ ∞, the explicit solution of SMAX(y)
could be obtained as the following result.
Proposition 2.1.4 (Theorem 3.1, Egozcue et al., 2013) The optimal strategy function SMAX(y)
is
SMAX(y) = 1(x1,b)(y)
with the threshold b := sup{x > µL : v(x) > w(x)}, where
v(x) :=
p (µH − x)
(1 − p) (x − µL) .
In particular, when
µL = µH(≡ µ),
then
SMAX(y) = 1(x1,µ)(y).
The other situation discussed in Egozcue et al. (2013) is that
XH = αXL
for a constant α > 1. This is equivalent to
fH(x) = (1/α) fL(x/α)
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and thus
SRP(S ) = (α − 1)
∫
S (x)x
[
p fL(x) − (1 − p) 1
α2
fL
( x
α
)]
dx.
Hence functionHMAX(x) could be chosen as
HMAX(x) = p fL(x) − (1 − p) 1
α2
fL
( x
α
)
.
The readers are referred to the integrand of (2.2) of McDonnell and Abbott (2009) as a particu-
lar case α = 2. As the result of SMAX(y) depends on fL(x), the rest of the discussion in Egozcue
et al. (2013) is based on three particular distributions for XL.
1. When XL is uniform on [A, B] for some 0 ≤ A < B ≤ ∞, then
SMAX(y) =

1[A,αA)(y) when αA ≤ B and p ≤ 11+α2 ,
1[A,B] otherwise.
To decipher this result in terms of the decision-making language, consider the doublet
(α, p) ∈ (1,∞) × [0, 1]. If we define a subset:
∆ :=
{
(α, p) ∈ (1,∞) × [0, 1] : α ≤ B
A
, p ≤ 1
1 + α2
}
,
then the decision rule is:
• when (α, p) < ∆, then the current offer should always be rejected, irrespectively of
the price y;
• when (α, p) ∈ ∆, then the current offer should be rejected if the price y < αA.
Otherwise, the current offer should be accepted.
2. When XL is a log-normal random variable having density
fL(x) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
exp
−(log(x) − µ)22σ2
 1(0,∞)(x)
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for some parameters µ ∈ (−∞,∞) and σ > 0. Then
SMAX(y) = 1(0,b)(y)
with the threshold
b =
√
αeµ
(
pα
1 − p
)σ2/ logα
.
3. When XL is a Pareto random variable having density
fL(x) =
θ
x0
( x0
x
)θ+1
1[x0,∞)(x)
for some parameters x0 > 0 and θ > 1. Then
SMAX(y) =

1[x0,αx0)(y) when p ≤ 11+α1−θ ,
1[x0,∞] otherwise.
To decipher this result in terms of the decision-making language, consider the doublet
(α, p) ∈ (1,∞) × [0, 1]. If we define a subset:
Ξ :=
{
(α, p) ∈ (1,∞) × [0, 1] : p ≤ 1
1 + α1−θ
}
,
then the decision rule is:
• when (α, p) < Ξ, then the current offer should always be rejected, irrespectively of
the price y,
• when (α, p) ∈ Ξ, then the current offer should be rejected if the price y < αx0.
Otherwise, the current offer should be accepted.
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2.2 Price discrimination
Price discrimination describes pricing behaviors and pricing preferences of monopoly enter-
prises in a monopolistic competitive market. Price discrimination happens when units of the
same product are sold at different prices, either to the same consumers or different consumers.
Definition 2.2.1 Price discrimination is a microeconomic pricing strategy where identical or
largely similar goods or services are transacted at different prices by the providers in different
markets/consumers.
According to the classification of Pigou (1920), price discrimination may take three forms:
first-degree price discrimination, second-degree price discrimination and third-degree price
discrimination.
Definition 2.2.2 First-degree price discrimination is a pricing strategy where each consumer
is charged the maximum amount they are willing to pay for each unit.
First-degree price discrimination means that the producer can charge whatever the market will
bear and thus captures the entire consumer surplus. It involves the seller charging a different
price for each unit of the commodity in such a way that the amount charged for each unit
is equal to the maximum willingness-to-pay for that unit. It is also known as perfect price
discrimination.
Definition 2.2.3 Second-degree price discrimination is a pricing strategy where price varies
according to quantity demanded. Larger quantities of the same product are sold at a lower unit
price; Smaller quantities of the same product are sold at a higher unit price.
Second-degree price discrimination involves selling larger quantities of the same product at
a lower unit price. It occurs when price differs depending on the number of units that the
good bought, but not across consumers. This phenomenon is also known as nonlinear pricing.
Each consumer faces the same price schedule, but the schedule involves different price for
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the different amount of the good purchased. Quantity discounts or premia are the prominent
examples.
Definition 2.2.4 Third-degree price discrimination is a pricing strategy where producers charge
a different price to different consumer groups.
Third-degree price discrimination takes place when different prices are charged for the same
product to different consumers. It means that different purchasers are charged different prices,
but each buyer pays a constant amount for each unit of the good bought. It is perhaps the most
common form of price discrimination; examples are student discounts or charging different
prices on different days of the week.
2.2.1 Willingness-to-pay and marginal willing-to-pay of price discrimi-
nation
To understand three forms of price discrimination in an economic environment, we introduce
a model of willingness-to-pay (Varian, 1992). Suppose there are many potential consumers
whose utility functions are
ui(x) + y,
for i ∈ 1, 2, . . ., and x represents the interested good, y represents all other goods. Denote r(i)
is the maximum willingness-to-pay for some consumption level x such that it is the solution to
the equation
ui(0) + y = ui − ri(x) + y. (2.5)
We define ui(x) = 0 for simlicity, and get naturally
ri(x) ≡ ui(x). (2.6)
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Furthermore if the consumer faces a per-unit price p(x) of x, budget limit of m, and chooses
the optimal level of consumption, then equivalently it is the maximization problem
max
x,y
ui(x) + y
subject to p(x)x + y = m.
The first order condition for this problem is
p(x) = u′i(x). (2.7)
The price necessary to induce consumer i to choose consumption level x, i.e., the marginal
willing-to-pay, is
p(x) = pi(x) ≡ u′i(x).
Definition 2.2.5 Suppose that the maximum willingness-to-pay for the good by consumer k,
always exceeds the maximum willingness-to-pay by consumer j,
uk(x) > u j(x), (2.8)
for all x. For the marginal willingness-to-pay, we suppose
u′k(x) > u
′
j(x), (2.9)
which means the marginal willingness-to-pay for the good by consumer k exceeds the marginal
willingness-to-pay by consumer j. Then the consumer k is regarded as the high demand con-
sumer and the consumer j is regarded as the low demand consumer.
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2.2.2 First-degree price discrimination
First-degree price discrimination is also known as perfect price discrimination. In term of first-
degree price discrimination, the consumer surplus is 0, because it is reaped by the producer.
Selling an extra unit does not require lowering the price of the previously sold units, since each
one may be sold at a different price. Demand and marginal revenue curves are therefore con-
founded, and the profit maximizing condition (marginal revenue equals marginal cost) yields
the same output as a competitive market. If a monopoly can practice perfect discrimination,
the outcome will thus be Pareto efficient, which is a quite counter-intuitive result. Transaction
and research costs involved in finding the willingness-to-pay of each consumer make this case
extremely unlikely in the real world, i.e., it is an ideal case.
Definition 2.2.6 Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the total amount that
consumers are willing and able to pay for a good or service (indicated by the demand curve)
and the total amount that they do pay (i.e. the market price).
Definition 2.2.7 Producer surplus is an economic measure of the difference between the amount
a producer of a good received and the minimum amount the producer is willing to accept for
a good. The difference, or surplus value, is the benefit the producer receives for selling the
commodity in the market.
Theoretically first-degree price discrimination requires the monopoly seller of a good or
service to know the absolute maximum price (or reservation price) that every consumer is
willing to pay. By knowing the reservation price, the seller is able to sell the good or service
to each consumer at the maximum price he is willing to pay, and thus transform the consumer
surplus into revenues. So the profit is equal to the sum of consumer surplus and producer
surplus (see Figure 2.1). The marginal consumer is the one whose reservation price equals to
the marginal cost of the product. Suppose a monopolist offers goods to one agent in the market
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Figure 2.1: The first-degree price discrimination. The vertical axis represents the price level
of a commodity. The horizontal axis represents the quantity of goods. Curve MC is marginal
cost curve. Curve D is demand curve, also known as marginal revenue curve here. The profit
maximizing condition (marginal revenue equals marginal cost MR = MC) indicates the pairs
of the quantity and the price, (QM, PM). The price PM is a market clearing price. QM is a market
clearing quantity, which matchs the market clearing price. A + B means the profit, which is
equal to the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus here.
at this moment. The profit maximization problem of the monopolist is
max
x,r
r − cx
subject to u(x) ≥ r
where c is a constant marginal cost of per unit of the monopolist. The first order condition for
this problem is
u′(x∗) = c.
The corresponded willing-to-pay price is
r = r(x∗) = u(x∗).
Now let’s imagine next if the monopolist sells each unit of output to the consumer at a different
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price. Suppose, for example, that the firm breaks up the output into n pieces of size ∆x, so that
x = n∆x. Considering the willing-to-pay price,
u(0) = u(∆) − p1,
u(∆) = u(2∆) − p2,
...
u((n − 1)∆) = u(x) − pn.
we have
i=1∑
n
pn = u(x),
by adding up these n equations. That is the sum of the marginal willingnesses-to-pay, which
must equal the total willingness-to-pay.
2.2.3 Second-degree price discrimination
Second-degree price discrimination is also known as nonlinear pricing: prices vary across units,
but not across people. The usual example of second-degree price discrimination is quantity dis-
counts, when larger quantities of the same product are sold at a lower unit price. Producers use
this technique when they know different consumer groups exist, but have no way of observing
them. The complete extraction of consumer surplus is not possible as it was in the first-degree
price discrimination, but the producer can still design some price scheme to force consumers to
reveal their type. Second-degree price discrimination is a more realistic case of price discrimi-
nation. It is often practiced by public utilities, as the price per unit of water and electricity often
depends on how much is consumed. Consumers self-select themselves into consumption cate-
gories. The description for Figure 2.2 are as follows. Suppose there are two groups of people
with different numbers of people, a smaller number Q1 for group 1, and a larger number Q2 for
group 2. In terms of the second-degree price discrimination, the producers offer a higher price
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Figure 2.2: The second-degree price discrimination. The vertical axis represents the price level
of a commodity. The horizontal axis represents the quantity of goods. Curve D is demand
curve here. The point (Q1, P1) on the curve D means the producers offer price P1 to the group
1 with the consumer group number who has the group number Q1. The point (Q2, P2) on the
curve D means the producers offer price P2 to the consumer group 2 who has the group number
Q1.
P1 of goods for group 1, and a lower price P2 of goods for group 2, i.e. Q1 < Q2 and P2 < P1.
Figure 2.2 shows a kind of price discrimination which indicates price varies according to the
quantity demanded.
We suppose there are two consumers, and each consumer want to consume the amount xi
and be willing to pay the price ri,
ui(xi) − ri ≥ 0,
for i = 1, 2. Also we suppose each consumer prefer his consumption to the consumption of the
other consumer 
u1(x1) − r1 ≥ u1(x2) − r2,
u2(x2) − r2 ≥ u2(x1) − r1.
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Because of the equations of 2.8 and 2.9, we can continue to calculate and get

r2 = u2(x2) − u2(x1) + r1,
r1 = u1(x1).
Considering the profit function of the monopolist is
pi = (r1 − cx1) + (r2 − cx2),
we replace r1 and r2 and reach equivalently,
pi = (u1(x1) − cx1) + (u2(x2) − u2(x1) + r1 − cx2).
Differentiating it with respect to xl and x2 to get a maximized expression

u′1(x1) = c + (u
′
2(x1) − u′1(x1)),
u′2(x2) = c.
(2.10)
Equation (2.10) says that at the optimal nonlinear prices, the high demand consumer has a
marginal willingness-to-pay which is equal to marginal cost; and the low demand consumer has
a (marginal) value for the good that exceeds marginal cost. Hence he consumes an inefficiently
small amount of the good.
2.2.4 Third-degree price discrimination
Third-degree price discrimination consists of distinguishing several groups of consumers with
different demands to charge them different prices. Producers discriminate between groups of
people, but not across units, as consumers are charged different prices, but each one faces a
constant price for all units of output purchased. It is used to take advantage of the fact that
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different groups of people have different demand functions. The usual example of third-degree
price discrimination is student discounts at the movies or sports events. Third-degree price
discrimination is also practiced by pharmaceutical firms who sell the same drugs in different
countries at different prices.
Definition 2.2.8 Price elasticity of demand is a measure used in economics to show the rela-
tionship between a change in the quantity demanded of a good or service and a change in its
price. It gives the percentage change in quantity demanded in response to a one percent change
in price.
(p) =
dQ/Q
dP/P
. (2.11)
where Q is the quantity demanded of a good or service, and P are the price of the good or the
service.
Figure 2.3 gives us a brief view about the third-degree price discrimination. Suppose there
are two markets/groups, markets/groups 1, and markets/groups 2, with different price elastic-
ities of demand. Assume group 1 is relatively lack of elasticity of demand, and group 2 is
relatively elastic. In terms of the third-degree price discrimination, the producers offer a higher
price p1 of goods for group 1, and a lower price p2 of goods for group 2, i.e. p2 < p1. Figure
2.3 shows a kind of price discrimination which indicates producers charge a different price to
different consumers of markets/groups.
The model description of the third-degree price discrimination is following. Indeed we
suppose there are two groups of consumers in two separate markets/groups, and define pi, for
i = 1, 2, as the inverse demand function for group i of consumers. The monopolist’s profit
maximization problem is
max
x1,x2
p1(x1)x1 + p2(x2)x2 − cx1 − cx2. (2.12)
2.2. Price discrimination 33
Q1 Q2 Qq1
p1
A
q2
p2
B
q
p
C
P1 P2 P
D1 D2 D
MC1 MC2 T MC
MR1 MR2 MR
Figure 2.3: The third-degree price discrimination. The vertical axis represents the price level
of a commodity. The horizontal axis represents the quantity of goods. Curve MC is marginal
cost curve. Also, curve MC is supply curve here. Curve D is demand curve, also known
as average revenue curve here. The demand curves D1 and D2 are different, which means the
price elasticities of demand in two markets/groups are different. Curve MR is marginal revenue
curve. The profit maximizing condition (marginal revenue equals marginal cost MR = MC)
indicates the pairs of the quantities and the prices, (q1, p1), (q2, p2) and (q, p) respectively. A
means the profit from the market/group 1. B means the profit from market/group 2. A + B = C.
C means the total profits from both two markets/groups.
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Differentiating the equation (2.12) with respect to xl and x2 to get a maximized expression

p1(x1) + p′1(x1)x1 = c,
p2(x2) + p′2(x2)x2 = c.
(2.13)
We rewrite the equations (2.13) by

p1(x1)(1 − 11 ) = c,
p2(x2)(1 − 12 ) = c.
(2.14)
Proposition 2.2.1 If we have the equations (2.14), then
p1(x1) > p2(x2)
if and only if
|1| < |2|.
As one of the behaviours of monopoly enterprises in a monopolistic competitive market,
the third-degree price discrimination means a selling strategy that the same provider charges
different prices for identical or just similar goods or services in different consumer groups with
different demand curves, and demand elasticities as well (cf., Aguirre, 2010; Holmes, 1989;
Pindyck, and Rubinfeld, 2001; Schmalensee, 1981; Schwartz, 1990; Yoshida, 2000; Varian,
1992). The product differentiation is one of the crucial reasons why firms have some degree of
control over the price. The more successful it is at differentiating its product from other firms
selling similar products, the more monopoly power the form has. Product differences are due
to quality, functional features, design, and so on, and so there is imperfect substitution between
commodities even when they are in the same category (cf., Krugman, 1980; Head, and Ries,
2001; Helpman, 1981; Nguyen, 2014; Varian, 1992).
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In our cases, the Lenovo laptop gets differentiated from other laptops because of its brand,
quality, reputation, and so on, and thus gets imperfect substitution between different kinds of
laptops. Consider that most consumers who buy laptops during the Black Friday promotion pe-
riod have stronger laptop buying intention than most of the consumers who buy laptops during
the Boxing Day promotion period. That is, the demand curves during these two periods have
different demand elasticities of price: during the Black Friday promotion period, the demand
elasticities of price is smaller than that during the Boxing Day promotion period. Considering
this difference between buying intentions during two periods, the buyers during the two periods
can be regarded as two separate markets with different demand curves and different demand
elasticities, and the monopolist firm can tend to enforce the division of the selling prices during
the two periods; this is the third-degree price discrimination.
2.3 Parametrical models
2.3.1 Beta distribution
Naturally, distributions supported on a bounded domain are considered for modelling the dis-
counted prices of certain goods since the given prices are bounded above by the original prices
while bounded below by 0 (in general, a seller will not sell a product if the price is below certain
levels xmin > 0). One of the very basic distributions with bounded supports is the Beta distribu-
tion, which will be employed to model the prices that vary within a fixed interval throughout
this thesis. A formall definition of the Beta distribution is provided below from the perspective
of the seller (the exact range of the discounted price is known to the seller).
Definition 2.3.1 A random variable X defined on [xmin, xmax] is said to have Beta distribution
if the density function fX(x) exists and has the following location-scale form:
fX(x) =

(x − xmin)α−1 (xmax − x)β−1
B(α, β)ρα+β−1
if xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax,
0 otherwise,
(2.15)
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where α > 0 and β > 0 are the shape parameters, xmin (xmin < xmax) is the location parameter,
ρ = xmax − xmin is the scale parameter, and B(α, β) is the Beta function of α and β.
Without loss of generality, we set xmin = 0 and xmax = 1, such that ρ = 1. We have graphed
the probability density functions and cumulative distribution functions of Beta distribution with
different values of α and β, in Figure 2.4 and in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: The probability density functions of Beta distribution with different parameter
values of α and β. The simulated random variable is defined on [0, 1] and the selected parameter
combinations of Beta distribution are B(0.5, 0.5), B(5, 1), B(1, 3), B(2, 2) and B(2, 5).
Some other distributional properties cannot be expressed in terms of elementary functions,
hence for the computational reason we introduce the hypergeometric functions defined below.
Definition 2.3.2 The hypergeometric function 2F1 is defined by the power series
2F1(a, b; c; z) =
∞∑
n=0
(a)n(b)n
(c)n
zn
n!
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Figure 2.5: The cumulative distribution functions of Beta distribution with different parameter
values of α and β. The simulated random variable is defined on [0, 1] and the selected parameter
combinations of Beta distribution are B(0.5, 0.5), B(5, 1), B(1, 3), B(2, 2) and B(2, 5).
for |z| < 1, where (q)n is the Pochhammer symbol defined by
(q)n =

∏n−1
i=0 (q + i) if n > 1,
1 if n = 0.
A famous integral representation of the hypergeometric function 2F1(a, b; c; z) is given below,
which reveals the potential relation between 2F1(a, b; c; z) and a Beta distribution.
Proposition 2.3.1 For<(c) > <(a) > 0 and z < {x ∈ R : x ≥ 1}, the hypergeometric function
2F1(a, b; c; z) could be written as
2F1(a, b; c; z) =
Γ(c)
Γ(a)Γ(c − a)
∫ 1
0
ta−1(1 − t)c−a−1(1 − zt)−bdt.
Hence some other distributional properties of the Beta distribution could be expressed in terms
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of the hypergeometric function 2F1(a, b; c; z) or Pochhammer symbol.
Proposition 2.3.2 If random variable X follows Beta distribution having density function (2.15),
then
1. The cumulative distribution function of X could be written as
FX(x) =

(x − xmin) /ρ
αB(α, β) 2
F1(α, 1 − β;α + 1; (x − xmin) /ρ) if xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax,
0 if x < xmin,
1 if x > xmax.
2. The rth moment of X − xmin is
E
[
(X − xmin)r] = ρr(α)r(α + β)r .
In particular,
E [X] = xmin +
ρα
α + β
and
Var(X) =
ρ2αβ
(α + β)2(α + β + 1)
.
3. The characteristic function of X could be written as
φX(t) = 1F1(α;α + β; iρt)e−itρxmin ,
where i =
√−1 and 1F1(a; b; z) is the confluent hypergeometric function defined by
1F1(a; b; z) =
∞∑
n=0
(a)n
(b)n
zn
n!
.
In later chapters, the two-period choice problem as an analog of the two-envelope paradox will
be discussed, in which the dependence between the prices given in different period plays an
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important role. Hence the density function of the product of two independent random vari-
able following Beta distributions is provided below in terms of the hypergeometric function
2F1(a, b; c; z).
Proposition 2.3.3 (Corallary 3.1.2, Nagar and Zarrazola, 2004) If X and Y are two indepen-
dent random variables having the standard Beta distribution (xmin = 0 and ρ = 1) with the
shape parameters (αX, βX) and (αY , βY) respectively, then the density function of their product
could be expressed in terms of the Gauss hypergeometric function 2F1, namely,
fXY(z) =
Γ (αX + βX) Γ (αY + βY)
Γ (βX + βY) Γ (αX) Γ (αY)
zαX−1 (1 − z)βX+βY−1 2F1 (βY , αX + βX − αY ; βX + βY ; 1 − z)
for all z ∈ [0, 1], and fXY(z) = 0 otherwise.
Corollary 2.3.4 Under the assumptions provided in Proposition 2.3.3, if αY = αX + βX, then
XY follows a Beta distribution with shape parameters αX and βX + βY .
These distributional results will help illustrate how the optimal choice of purchase should be
made based on the theoretical framework provided in this thesis.
2.3.2 Gamma distribution
Unlike the discounted prices of goods, bidding prices do not seem to have an obvious upper
bound. As a result, Beta distribution may not be appropriate for modelling the bidding prices.
Instead, distributions with unbounded support such as the Gamma distribution could be a bet-
ter choice. Throughout this thesis, bidding prices are assumed to have Gamma distributions
(denoted as Ga(α, β)) with the following density function
fα,β(t) =

βα
Γ(α)
tα−1e−βt if t > 0,
0 if t ≤ 0.
(2.16)
where α > 0 is the shape parameter and β > 0 is the rate parameter.
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Without loss of generality, we have graphed the probability density functions and cumula-
tive distribution functions of Gamma distribution with different parameter values of α and β, in
Figure 2.6 and in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.6: The probability density functions of Gamma distribution with different parameter
values of α and β. The simulated random variable is defined on [0,∞) and the selected parame-
ter combinations of Gamma distribution are Ga(1, 0.5), Ga(2, 0.5), Ga(3, 0.5), Ga(5, 1), Ga(9, 2)
and Ga(7.5, 1).
Gamma distributions are extensively used in the literature of modeling prices (see, e.g.,
Hong & Shum, 2006; Pratt, Wise & Zeckhauser, 1979). In particular, Hong and Shum (2006)
apply the gamma distribution to model search costs, including time, energy and money spent
on researching products, or services, for purchasing. There are numerous cases of using the
gamma distribution when modeling insurance losses (e.g., Alai et al., 2013; Furman & Lands-
man, 2005; Hu¨rlimann, 2001).
Distributional properties pertaining to the Gamma distribution parameterized as (2.16) in-
clude:
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Figure 2.7: The cumulative distribution functions of Gamma distribution with different param-
eter values of α and β. The simulated random variable is defined on [0,∞) and the selected
parameter combinations of Gamma distribution are Ga(1, 0.5), Ga(2, 0.5), Ga(3, 0.5), Ga(5, 1),
Ga(9, 2) and Ga(7.5, 1).
1. The cumulative distribution function corresponding to fα,β is
Fα,β(x) =
γ(α, βx)
Γ(α)
, x > 0,
where γ(·, ·) is the lower incomplete gamma function.
2. The rth moments of the gamma distribution are given by
E [Xr] =
Γ(α + r)
βrΓ(α)
.
In particular, the mean of Ga(α, β) is E[X] = α
β
and the variance is Var(X) = α
β2
.
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3. The characteristic function of Ga(α, β) is
φX(t) =
(
β
β − it
)α
,
where i =
√−1.
Similar to the Beta distributions, the distribution functions product of independent Gamma
random variables cannot be expressed in terms of elementary functions as well. Hence we
shall introduce the Meijer G-function defined as follows to help develop the representation of
these distribution functions.
Definition 2.3.3 In general, the Meijer G-function is defined by
Gm,np,q
z
∣∣∣∣∣∣a1, · · · , apb1, . . . , bq
 = 12pii
∫
L
∏m
j=1 Γ(b j − s)
∏n
j=1 Γ(1 − a j + s)∏q
j=m+1 Γ(1 − b j + s)
∏p
j=n+1 Γ(a j − s)
zsds, z , 0
for 0 ≤ m ≤ q and 0 ≤ n ≤ p where m, n, p, q ∈ N. Moreover, ak − b j , 1, 2, 3, . . . for
k = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. The integral path L has three possible choices.
1. L runs from −i∞ to i∞ such that all poles of Γ(b j − s), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m are located on the
right of the path while all poles of Γ(1 − ak + s), k = 1, 2, . . . , n are located on the right
of the path. The integral then converges on {z ∈ C : |arg z| < δpi}, where
δ = m + n − 1
2
(p + q)
and δ > 0.
2. L is a loop beginning and ending at +∞, encircling all poles of Γ(b j − s), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
exactly once in the negative direction, but not encircling any of poles of Γ(1 − ak + s),
k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then the integral converges for all z if q > p ≥ 0; it also converges for
q = p > 0 on {z ∈ C : |z| > 1}.
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3. L is a loop beginning and ending at −∞, encircling all poles of Γ(1−ak+s), k = 1, 2, . . . , n
exactly once in the positive direction, but not encircling any of poles of Γ(b j − s), j =
1, 2, . . . ,m. Then the integral converges for all z if p > q ≥ 0; it also converges for
p = q > 0 on {z ∈ C : |z| > 1}.
Now the distribution functions as well as the Laplace transform of independent Gamma random
variables could be expressed in terms of the Meijer G-functions as shown by Nadarajah (2011).
Proposition 2.3.5 (Lemma 1, Nadarajah, 2011) Suppose X and Y are independent random
variables following Ga(αX, βX) and Ga(αY , βY) respectively. Then the Lapace transform of XY
are
E
[
e−sXY
]
=
1
Γ(αX)Γ(αY)
G1,mm,1
 sβXβY
∣∣∣∣∣∣1 − αX, αY0

for s ∈ {z ∈ C : <(z) ≥ 0}.
Proposition 2.3.6 (Lemma 2, Nadarajah, 2011) Suppose X and Y are independent random
variables following Ga(αX, βX) and Ga(αY , βY) respectively. Then the density function and the
cumulative distribution function of XY are
fXY(z) =
1
Γ(αX)Γ(αY)z
G2,00,2
βXβYz
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −
αX, αY

and
FXY(z) =
1
Γ(αX)Γ(αY)
G2,11,3
βXβYz
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1
αX, αY , 0

respectively, for z > 0.
2.3.3 Geometric Brownian motion
When foreign investors take part in the bidding for certain asset, the foreign currency exchange
rates matter. Particularly for the two-period decision problem, the decision-making procedure
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in the first period must take into account the projection of these exchagne rates for the second
period . A simplest model for describing the behavior of the exchange rates is the geometric
Brownian motion, which was used by Biger and Hull (1983) for valuing the currency options.
As this thesis is not focusing on modelling the exchange rates, we adopt the assumption that
exchange rates could be described by geometric Brownian motions. A formal definition of
geometric Brownian motion is given below.
Definition 2.3.4 Suppose that {Wt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion defined on (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0 ,P)
and that µB ∈ R and σB > 0. Let
Xt = x exp
{(
µB − σ
2
B
2
)
t + σBWt
}
, t ∈ [0,∞). (2.17)
Then the stochastic process {Xt}t≥0 is a geometric Brownian motion starting from x. GBM(µB, σB)
is a geometric Brownian motion with drift µB and volatility σB.
Without loss of generality, we have graphed the simulated geometric Brownian motion with
x = 1, and different drift parameters and volatility parameters of µB and σB, GBM(1, 0.5) and
GBM(0.5, 1), in Figure 2.8.
For any fixed t ≥ 0, the distributional properties of the random variable Xt are listed below:
1. Xt follows a log-normal distribution with density function
ft(x) =

1√
2pitσBx
exp
−
[
log(x) −
(
µB − σ2B/2
)
t
]2
2σ2t
 if x ∈ (0,∞),
0 if x ≤ 0.
2. The cumulative distribution function of Xt is given by
Ft(x) =

Φ
 log(x) −
(
µB − σ2B/2
)
t
σB
√
t
 if x ∈ (0,∞),
0 if x ≤ 0,
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Figure 2.8: The simulated geometric Brownian motion with x = 1, and different drift param-
eters and volatility parameters of µ and σ. The simulated random variable is defined on [0, 1]
and the selected parameter combinations of geometric Brownian motion are GBM(1, 0.5) and
GBM(0.5, 1).
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
3. The p-quantile function of Xt is given by
F−1t (p) = exp
{(
µB − σ2B/2
)
t + σB
√
tΦ−1(p)
}
, p ∈ (0, 1),
where Φ−1(·) is the standard normal quantile function.
4. For n ∈ N, the n-th moment
E
[
Xnt
]
= enµBt.
In particular, we have
E [Xt] = eµBt
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and
Var (Xt) =
[
exp
(
σ2Bt
)
− 1
]
exp(µBt).
Besides, geometric Brownian motion satisfies centain stochastic differential equation.
Proposition 2.3.7 The geometric Brownian motion {Xt}t≥0 defined by (2.17) satisfies the stochas-
tic differential equation
dXt = µBXtdt + σBXtdWt, t ≥ 0.
Chapter 3
Two-stage optimal decisions from the
buyer’s perspective
3.1 Motivation
In need of a laptop in the Fall of 2015, I was looking for a good on-line deal. Benefiting
from the advantages of on-line shopping, he acquired considerable information on the Lenovo
T540 laptop price. Two forthcoming time-periods were of immediate interest: the Black Friday
promotion from November 27th to December 3rd, 2015, and the Boxing Day promotion from
December 26th, 2015, to January 3rd, 2016.
Obviously, it was prudent to wait until the Black Friday promotion period, which revealed
the discounted price of 1,431.01 Canadian dollars for the laptop, but it was not obvious at
that moment whether he wanted to buy the laptop at that price or wait until the Boxing Day
promotion. (The price of Lenovo T540 laptop during the Boxing Day promotion period turned
out to be 1,461.60 Canadian dollars, which was not, of course, known during the Black Friday
promotion period.) Can there be a strategy for making good decisions during the Black Friday
promotion period?
The present chapter aims at answering this question by deriving an optimal strategy that
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minimizes the expected buying price. The idea for tackling this problem stems from the pi-
oneering work of McDonnell and Abbott (2009) on the two-envelope paradox, with further
far-reaching considerations by McDonnell et al. (2011). It also relies on some of the tech-
niques put forward by Egozcue et al. (2013) who have extended the aforementioned works
beyond the two-envelope paradox.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we lay out the necessary
mathematical background and derive two optimal strategies: one when there is no guessing of
the second time-period price, and another one when such guessing takes place. In Sections 3.3
and 3.4 we discuss price modeling and parameter specifications of practical relevance. Section
3.5 contains proofs.
3.2 Main results
We start out by carefully describing the decision-making process, and also introduce the nec-
essary notation. First, the prospective buyer contacts a sales representative during the first
time-period. To somewhat simplify the problem, we assume that there are two kinds of sales
representatives:
i) those, call them L, who tend to offer larger discounts and thus lower prices XL;
ii) others, say H, who tend to offer smaller discounts and thus higher prices XH.
Both XL and XH are random variables. We denote their joint cumulative distribution func-
tion (cdf) by FXL,XH (x, y) and assume that it is absolutely continuous, that is, has a density
fXL,XH (x, y), which is a natural assumption in the current context.
Let Π1 denote the random variable that takes the values L and H depending on which (kind
of) salesperson takes the prospective buyer’s call during the first time-period. Hence, when
Π1 = L, then the price is XL, and when Π1 = H, then XH.
Once the prospective buyer learns the price during the first time-period (i.e., Black Friday),
he has two options: to either accept the offer or reject it and then inevitably wait till the second
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time-period (i.e., Boxing Day). If the buyer thinks that the first time-period offer is good
enough, he accepts it and the purchasing process ends. However, if the buyer rejects the offer,
then he has to wait until the second time-period and then inevitably accept whatever offer is
made to him at that time. He has to do so, because he needs a laptop and the regular price is
less attractive than any of the discounted ones.
Let ∆1 denote the random variable that represents the prospective buyer’s decision during
the first time-period: ∆1 = A if the buyer accepts the first-period offer and ∆1 = R if he rejects
it. The aim of the present article is to offer an optimal strategy that minimizes the average
E[X] of the buying price X, which could be either XL or XH depending the the buyer’s decision
during the first time-period.
We assume that the decision to accept or reject the price offered during the first time-period
does not depend on who, L or H, makes the offer – it depends only on the price being offered.
That is, we assume that the equation
P[∆1 = δ | XΠ1 = x, XΠ2 = y,Π1 = pi] = P[∆1 = δ | XΠ1 = x, XΠ2 = y] (3.1)
holds for every decision δ ∈ {A,R} (i.e., accept or reject) and for every salesperson pi ∈ {L,H},
where Π2 (, Π1) denotes the salesperson who makes the offer during the second time-period.
Theorem 3.2.1 When the price of the first time-period is v and there is no attempt to guess
the possible price to be offered during the second time-period, then the strategy that minimizes
the expected buying price is to accept the offer when R(v) ≤ 0 and to reject it when R(v) > 0,
where the “no guessing strategy” function R(v) is
R(v) =
∫
(v − w)p(v,w) fXL,XH (v,w)dw +
∫
(v − w)(1 − p(w, v)) fXL,XH (w, v)dw (3.2)
with the notation
p(x, y) = P(Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y), (3.3)
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which is the probability that the salesperson L makes an offer during the first time-period given
that the prices offered by L and H are x and y, respectively.
It is natural to think of the joint density fXL,XH (v,w) as a continuous function with compact
support [xmin, xmax] × [xmin, xmax], where xmin is the reservation price from the supply side (i.e.,
computer technology company) and xmax is the reservation price from the demand side (i.e.,
consumer). Hence, fXL,XH (w, v) = 0 when v or w, or both, are outside the interval (xmin, xmax).
We also expect that under normal circumstances there should be a point v0 ∈ (xmin, xmax)
such that R(v) < 0 (accept the offer) for all v ∈ (xmin, v0) and R(v) > 0 (reject the offer)
for all v ∈ (v0, xmax), with R(v0) = 0. We indeed see this pattern in our illustrative Figure
3.1, where and elsewhere when graphing in this chapter we set the reservation prices to be
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Figure 3.1: The no-guessing-strategy function R(v). v0 [≈ 1, 434.43] is the point where the
function R(v) crosses the horizontal axis and R(v0) = 0. The region where R(v) < 0 for all
v ∈ (xmin, v0) is the accept region (accept the offer) and the region where R(v) > 0 for all
v ∈ (v0, xmax) is the reject region (reject the offer).
xmin = 1, 400 and xmax = 1, 600 Canadian dollars. For other specifications, including modelling
of the functions fXL,XH (v,w) and p(v,w), we refer to Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
We note that under the specifications, the point where the function R(v) crosses the hori-
zontal axis is v0 ≈ 1, 434.43, which delineates the acceptance (to the left) and rejection (to the
right) regions. It should also be noted that the inclusion of the point v0 into the acceptance
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region is arbitrary: whenever v ∈ (xmin, xmax) is such that R(v) = 0, we could very well flip a
coin to decide whether to accept the offer or reject it and wait until the next promotion period.
Theorem 3.2.2 When the price of the first time-period is v and the guessed price to be offered
during the second time-period is w, then the strategy that minimizes the expected buying price
is to accept the offer when R(v,w) ≤ 0 and to reject it when R(v,w) > 0, where the “guessing
strategy” surface is
R(v,w) = (v − w)p(v,w) fXL,XH (v,w) + (v − w)
(
1 − p(w, v)) fXL,XH (w, v) (3.4)
with p(v,w) defined in equation (3.3).
Note that R(v,w) = 0 when v = w, which is natural. It is also natural to expect that
R(v,w) < 0 (i.e., accept the first time-period price v) when v < w, and R(v,w) > 0 (i.e., reject
the first time-period price v) when v > w. We indeed see this pattern in Figure 3.2 and Figure
3.3, where we have depicted the surface R(v,w) and its contours.
We conclude this section with a brief note on the possible shapes of p(v,w), with more de-
tails to be provided in Section 3.4 below. Namely, upon recalling that p(v,w) is the probability
that L makes an offer during the first time-period, given that the offers of L and H are x and y
respectively, it is natural to model p(v,w) as F(v−w) with some cdf F such that F(0) = 1/2. In
Section 3.4, for example, we shall use the beta cdf with the same shape parameters, in which
case we shall have the equation F(x) = 1 − F(−x) for all x and thus, in particular, the require-
ment F(0) = 1/2. The following corollary to Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 deals with this special
case.
Corollary 3.2.3 Let p(v,w) = 1 − p(w, v) for all v and w. Then the guessing-strategy surface
is
R(v,w) = (v − w)p(v,w)( fXL,XH (v,w) + fXL,XH (w, v)),
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v
w
Figure 3.2: The guessing-strategy surface R(v,w). This figure is a 3D - visualization of the
function R(v,w). The lower left part of the figure indicates the area where R(v,w) < 0 when
v < w, i.e. accept the first time-period price v. The top right part of the figure indicates the
area where R(v,w) > 0 when v > w, i.e., reject the first time-period price v. The area where
R(v,w) = 0 is fuzzy and uncertain in this figure, and we refer to the Figure 3.3.
and the no-guessing-strategy function is
R(v) =
∫
R(v,w)dw.
The earlier drawn Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are based on this corollary, with practically
relevant modelling of fXL,XH (v,w) and p(v,w) to be discussed in the next two sections.
3.3 Modelling fXL,XH(x, y)
If the salespersons L and H were in total isolation, their offered prices would be outcomes of
two independent random variables, which we denote by X0L and X
0
H, both taking values in the
interval [xmin, xmax]. It is natural to assume that, for example, X0L and X
0
H are beta distributed on
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Figure 3.3: The contours of the guessing-strategy surface R(v,w). This figure is the contour
of the Figure 3.2. The diagonal here, from lower left to top right, is the line of R(v,w) = 0
when v = w. The top left area, where R(v,w) < 0 when v < w, is the accept region (accept the
first time-period price v) and the lower right area, where R(v,w) > 0 when v > w, is the reject
region (reject the first time-period price v).
[xmin, xmax] with positive shape parameters (αL, βL) and (αH, βH), respectively, that is,
fX0L(x) =
(x − xmin)αL−1(xmax − x)βL−1
B(αL, βL)ραL+βL−1
, xmin < x < xmax,
and
fX0H (x) =
(x − xmin)αH−1(xmax − x)βH−1
B(αH, βH)ραH+βH−1
, xmin < x < xmax,
where
ρ = xmax − xmin[> 0]
is the range of possible prices. Given the earlier noted numerical values of xmin and xmax,
we have ρ = 200. When graphing, we set the parameter values to (αL, βL) = (2.5, 4.5) and
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(αH, βH) = (4.5, 1.5) throughout this chapter.
The (observable) prices offered by L and H are, however, not X0L and X
0
H but those that have
been influenced by, e.g., the company’s marketing team or management. This naturally leads
us to the background model, which we choose to be multiplicative (cf., e.g., Franke et al., 2006,
2011; Asimit et al., 2016; and references therein). Namely, suppose that Y ∈ [xmin, xmax] is the
(random) price that the company’s marketing team, or management, would think appropriate,
and which therefore influences the actual decisions of L and H. The multiplicative background
model would suggest that the observable prices XL and XH would be of the form XLY and XHY ,
but when defined in this way they are outside the natural price-range [xmin, xmax]. To rectify the
situation, we first standardize the prices X0L, X
0
H, and Y using the equations
Z0L = (X
0
L − xmin)/ρ,
Z0H = (X
0
H − xmin)/ρ,
and
Z = (Y − xmin)/ρ,
and then model the observable prices as
XL = Z0LZρ + xmin
and
XH = Z0HZρ + xmin.
Throughout the rest of this section, we assume that X0L, X
0
H and Y are independent and thus,
in turn, their standardized versions Z0L, Z
0
H and Z are independent as well. We shall soon find
this assumption convenient; in fact, it is a natural assumption.
Let, for example, Y follow the beta distribution on the interval [xmin, xmax] with some (pos-
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itive) shape parameters (α0, β0). Then the pdf fZ(t) of Z is equal to
fα0,β0(t) :=
tα0−1(1 − t)β0−1
B(α0, β0)
, 0 < t < 1.
The marginal pdf’s of XL and XH are
fXL(x) =
1
ρ
∫ 1
tx
fαL,βL
( x − xmin
tρ
)1
t
fα0,β0(t)dt (3.5)
and
fXH (x) =
1
ρ
∫ 1
tx
fαH ,βH
( x − xmin
tρ
)1
t
fα0,β0(t)dt, (3.6)
respectively, where tx = (x − xmin)/ρ. We have depicted the pdf’s in Figure 3.4 and 3.5
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Figure 3.4: The influence of Y (dashed pdf in both panels) on X0L.
using (α0, β0) = (2.5, 2.5), and the earlier noted parameter choices for (αL, βL) and (αH, βH).
Similarly to equations (3.5) and (3.6), we derive the joint pdf
fXL,XH (x, y) =
1
ρ2
∫ 1
tx,y
fαL,βL
( x − xmin
tρ
)
fαH ,βH
(y − xmin
tρ
) 1
t2
fZ(t)dt,
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Figure 3.5: The influence of Y (dashed pdf in both panels) on X0H.
where tx,y = (max{x, y} − xmin)/ρ. We have depicted this pdf in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.
3.4 Modelling p(x, y)
To begin with, we view our problem within the context of two-period (also known as two-
stage) economy. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that many consumers who buy laptops
during the first time-period have stronger buying intention than most of the consumers who
buy laptops during the second time-period. That is, the demand curves during the two periods
have different demand elasticities of price: during the first time-period, the demand elasticity of
price is smaller than that during the second time-period. Considering this difference, the buyers
during the two periods can be viewed as two separate markets with different demand curves
and different demand elasticities, and monopolistic firms would tend to enforce the division of
selling prices during the two periods.
This leads us to the topic of third-degree price discrimination (e.g., Aguirre et al., 2010;
Schwartz, 1990), which in the monopolistic competitive market means that the same provider
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x
y
Figure 3.6: The joint pdf of XL and XH. This figure is a 3 − D visualization of the joint
distribution fXL,XH (x, y). The arrows in the figure indicate the larger trend of the values of x, y
and fXL,XH (x, y).
would charge different prices for similar goods or services in different consumer groups having
different demand curves and demand elasticities, such as those who buy laptops during the first
time-period and those who buy during the second period. In general, product differentiation
is one of the key factors why firms have some degree of control over the prices, and the more
successful a firm is at differentiating its products from other firms selling similar products,
the more monopoly power the firm has. Product differences arise due to quality, functional
features, design, and so on, and so there is imperfect substitution between products even when
they are in the same category (e.g., Head & Ries, 2001; Krugman, 1980).
Hence, in the case of our problem concerning laptops, there is arguably a tendency to offer
higher prices during the first time-period because the demand curve in the first period is a
relatively inelastic demand curve, due to stronger buying intention. Hence, it is natural that
firms would take advantage of this buying intention and offer higher prices during the first
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Figure 3.7: The contours of the joint pdf of XL and XH. This figure is the contour of the Figure
3.6.
time-period. Consequently, it would seem that the higher the price is offered by L, the higher
the probability that the consumer will receive an offer from L during the first time-period. The
higher the laptop price is offered by H, the lower the probability that an offer will come from
L during the first time-period. When L and H offer laptops at the same or similar price, then
the probability of getting an offer from L would be more or less the same as the probability of
getting an offer from H. In view of these arguments, the following properties seem natural:
1) p(x, y) is non-decreasing in x, for every fixed y ∈ (xmin, xmax);
2) p(x, y) is non-increasing in y, for every fixed x ∈ (xmin, xmax);
3) p(x, y) = 1/2 whenever x = y.
We next suggest an example of p(x, y) by setting it to be F(x − y), where F can be any
cdf such that F(0) = 1/2. For example, let F be the beta cdf on the interval [−ρ, ρ] with
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ρ = xmax − xmin and equal shape parameters, say γ > 0. That is,
p(x, y) =
1
B(γ, γ)(2ρ)2γ−1
∫ x−y
−ρ
(ρ + t)γ−1(ρ − t)γ−1dt,
depicted in Figure 3.8 and 3.9 with the parameter γ = 10, which we always use when graphing.
x
y
Figure 3.8: The probability surface p(x, y). This figure is a 3 − D visualization of the joint
distribution p(x, y). The arrows in the figure indicate the larger trend of the values of x, y and
p(x,y).
3.5 Proofs of Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
Our goal is to derive a strategy that leads to the minimal expected value E[X] of the buying
price X, which could be either XL or XH depending on the outcomes of the random variables
Π1 ∈ {L,H} and ∆1 ∈ {A,R}. We start with the equation
E[X] =
"
E[X | XL = x, XH = y]dFXL,XH (x, y) (3.7)
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Figure 3.9: The contours of the probability surface p(x, y). This figure is the contour of the
Figure 3.8.
and then work with the conditional expectation inside the integral.
Given XL = x and XH = y, the random variable X can take only the values x or y. Conse-
quently, we have the equation
E[X | XL = x, XH = y] = xP[X = x | XL = x, XH = y] + yP[X = y | XL = x, XH = y]. (3.8)
We next calculate the two probabilities on the right-hand of equation (3.8) based on which of
the two salespersons, L or H, is making offers during the first time-period, and also on the
consumer behavior during this period, who can either accept or reject the first-come offer.
To begin with, we employ the random variable Π1 ∈ {L,H} and have
P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y]
= P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L]P[Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y]
+ P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = H]P[Π1 = H | XL = x, XH = y]. (3.9)
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We next tackle the four probabilities on the right-hand side of equation (3.9), starting with the
first probability.
Using the random variable ∆1 ∈ {A,R}, we have the equation
P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L]
= P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L,∆1 = A]P[∆1 = A | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L]
+ P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L,∆1 = R]P[∆1 = R | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L]. (3.10)
The first probability on the right-hand side of equation (3.10) is equal to 1, and the third prob-
ability is equal to 0. Hence, equation (3.10) simplifies to
P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L] = P[∆1 = A | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L]. (3.11)
Similarly, we obtain the expression
P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = H] = P[∆1 = R | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = H] (3.12)
for the third probability on the right-hand side of equation (3.9). Using equations (3.11) and
(3.12) on the right-hand of equation (3.9), we have
P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y]
= P[∆1 = A | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L]P[Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y]
+ P[∆1 = R | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = H]P[Π1 = H | XL = x, XH = y]
= P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = x, XΠ2 = y,Π1 = L]P[Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y]
+ P[∆1 = R | XΠ2 = x, XΠ1 = y,Π1 = H]P[Π1 = H | XL = x, XH = y], (3.13)
where Π2 (, Π1) is the salesperson who offers prices during the second time-period. We now
recall assumption (3.1) that tells us that the decision to accept or reject the first-come offer does
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not depend on who makes the offer – the decision depends only on the size of the offer. Hence,
we have the equations
P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = x, XΠ2 = y,Π1 = L] = P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = x, XΠ2 = y] (3.14)
and
P[∆1 = R | XΠ2 = x, XΠ1 = y,Π1 = H] = 1 − P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = y, XΠ2 = x]. (3.15)
Given the description of our problem, we might naturally think that the decision variable ∆1
is independent of the hypothetical/speculative future value of XΠ2 , and thus the right-hand sides
of equations (3.14) and (3.15) simplify by leaving out the second conditions associated with
XΠ2 . We shall indeed consider this situation later, but at the moment we admit the possibility
(cf. Theorem 3.2.2) that some clues to the possible price offerings during the second time-
period might be available to the consumer.
With the notation
Sw(v) = P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = v, XΠ2 = w],
the right-hand side of equation (3.14) is equal to Sy(x) and the right-hand side of equation
(3.15) is equal to
1 − Sx(y).
Consequently, equation (3.13) turns into the following one
P[X = x | XL = x, XH = y]
= Sy(x)P[Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y] + (1 − Sx(y))P[Π1 = H | XL = x, XH = y]. (3.16)
This is a desired expression for the first probability on the right-hand side of equation (3.8). As
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to the second probability, analogous considerations lead to the equations
P[X = y | XL = x, XH = y]
= P[∆1 = A | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = H]P[Π1 = H | XL = x, XH = y]
+ P[∆1 = R | XL = x, XH = y,Π1 = L]P[Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y]
= Sx(y)P[Π1 = H | XL = x, XH = y] + (1 − Sy(x))P[Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y]. (3.17)
Applying equations (3.16) and (3.17) on the right-hand side of equation (3.8), we have
E[X | XL = x, XH = y]
= x
(
Sy(x)P[Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y] + (1 − Sx(y))P[Π1 = H | XL = x, XH = y]
)
+ y
(
Sx(y)P[Π1 = H | XL = x, XH = y] + (1 − Sy(x))P[Π1 = L | XL = x, XH = y]
)
which, with p(x, y) defined in equation (3.3), becomes
E[X | XL = x, XH = y] = x
(
Sy(x)p(x, y) + (1 − Sx(y))(1 − p(x, y))
)
+ y
(
Sx(y)(1 − p(x, y)) + (1 − Sy(x))p(x, y)
)
. (3.18)
We next rearrange the terms on the right-hand side of equation (3.18) by separating the strategy-
free and strategy-dependent terms:
E[X | XL = x, XH = y] = x(1 − p(x, y)) + yp(x, y)
+ Sy(x)
(
xp(x, y) − yp(x, y)
)
+ Sx(y)
(
y(1 − p(x, y)) − x(1 − p(x, y))
)
. (3.19)
Combining equations (3.19) and (3.7), we obtain the following decomposition
E[X] = µ0 + µ1(S), (3.20)
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where the strategy-free term is
µ0 =
" (
x(1 − p(x, y)) + yp(x, y)
)
dFXL,XH (x, y)
= E
[
XL(1 − p(XL, XH))] + E[XH p(XL, XH)]
and the strategy-dependent term is
µ1(S) =
"
Sy(x)
(
xp(x, y) − yp(x, y)
)
dFXL,XH (x, y)
+
"
Sx(y)
(
y(1 − p(x, y)) − x(1 − p(x, y))
)
dFXL,XH (x, y).
Rewriting the above equation in terms of the joint density fXL,XH (x, y), and also slightly chang-
ing some notation to avoid potential confusion, we arrive at the equation
µ1(S) =
∫ ∫
Sw(v)R(v,w)dvdw, (3.21)
where R(v,w) is defined by equation (3.4). Since Sw(v) is a probability and can thus take values
only in the unit interval [0, 1], integral (3.21) achieves its minimal value when
Sw(v) =

1 if R(v,w) ≤ 0,
0 if R(v,w) > 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.2.
We next deal with the case (cf. Theorem 3.2.1) when the decision random variable ∆1 is
independent of XΠ2 and thus Sw(v) does not depend on the price w offered during the second
time-period. Hence, instead of Sw(v), we now deal with the strategy function
S(v) = P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = v].
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Consequently, the above defined µ1(S) reduces to the integral
µ1(S) =
∫
S(v)R(v)dv, (3.22)
where R(v) is defined by equation (3.2). Integral (3.22) achieves its minimal value when
S(v) =

1 if R(v) ≤ 0,
0 if R(v) > 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.1.
Chapter 4
Optimal two-stage pricing strategies from
the seller’s perspective
4.1 Introduction
Commodity pricing has been a prominent topic in the literature, with various models and strate-
gies suggested and explored. In this chapter, motivated by a problem described next, we put
forward and investigate (both theoretically and numerically) a general model for pricing within
the two-period framework that naturally arises in the context of the motivating problem.
4.1.1 Motivating problem
In Punta del Este, a resort town in Uruguay, real-estate property is in demand by both domes-
tic and foreign buyers. As a recent example, the frequency distribution of buyers for certain
high-rise buildings was approximately as follows: 10% Uruguayans, 75% Argentineans, 10%
Brazilians, and the remaining 5% from the rest of the world (Chile, U.S.A., and so on). A few
immediate observations follow. First, the ratio of domestic and foreign buyers varies depend-
ing on a number of factors, including economic, financial, and political. Second, it has been
observed that the average foreign buyer is wealthier than the average domestic one, and thus
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tends to exhibit higher bidding prices. Furthermore, given the diversity of buyers, the prices
are usually in the US dollars (USD), but some of the building costs such as salaries of workers
are in the Uruguayan pesos (UYU).
To properly understand our problem, we need to describe the property development and
selling processes. Namely, contracted by an investor, a construction company starts building,
say, a residential tower. There are several stages of selling residential units: before, during, and
after the actual construction of the tower. Different pricing strategies are used at every stage.
It is frequently the case that, at least initially, the investor wishes to sell the units en masse and
thus hires a real-estate agent for several months. If the sale is not successful during this initial
stage, then the units are put on sale individually, with no particular time horizon set in advance,
and at a possibly different price, which could be higher or lower than the original price.
The goal that we set out in this chapter is to derive, under various scenarios of practical
relevance, optimal strategies for setting first- and second-stage prices, as well as to propose the
optimal timing for accomplishing these tasks, in order to maximize the overall seller’s expected
revenue. In the next subsection, we give a brief appraisal of what we have accomplished in the
current chapter, with a related though brief literature review given in the following subsection.
4.1.2 Results and findings – an appraisal
First, in this chapter we put forward a highly encompassing, yet tractable, model and explore
optimal pricing strategies from the seller’s perspective when buyer’s real-estate valuations and
decisions in the two stages are uncertain: they can be independent or dependent, identically
distributed, or stochastically dominate each other, be influenced by exogenous factors at various
degrees, and so on. In particular, we shall see from our considerations and examples in the next
section that the simultaneous pricing strategies yield higher expected revenues than those under
the sequential pricing strategy.
Second, we study the case when real estate costs are possibly denominated in different
currencies, as is the case in our motivating problem and, in general, is an important and very
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common factor in developing countries where large fractions of building costs are denominated
in foreign currencies. Hence, currency exchange-rate movements become important in that
they influence optimal pricing determination.
Third, our model provides conditions under which second-stage prices could be higher or
lower than the first-stage prices. This might, initially, be surprising because it is a common
intuitive assumption that if a property is not sold during the first stage, then the property price
should be reduced before commencing the second stage. As we shall see from our following
considerations, however, the relationship between the two stage prices is much more complex:
higher holding costs, currency exchange movements, or some type of dominance between the
first- and second-stage price distributions, could very much influence the determination of the
second-stage price, thus possibly making it larger than that of the first stage, assuming of course
that the property was not sold during the first stage.
Finally, our general model accommodates sellers with different shapes of their utility func-
tions, such as those arising in Behavioral Economics (see, e.g., Dhami, 2016). In general, while
working on this project, we were considerably influenced by, and benefited from, research con-
tributions by many authors, and the following brief literature snapshot highlights some of those
that we have found particularly related to the present chapter.
4.1.3 Related literature
House pricing from the seller’s and buyer’s perspectives has been studied by many authors.
For instance, Quan and Quigley (1991), and Biswas and McHardy (2007) adopt the seller’s
viewpoint in their research. Furthermore, Stigler (1962), Rothschild (1974), Gastwirth (1976),
Quan and Quigley (1991), Bruss (2003), and Egozcue et al. (2013) explore the problem from
the buyer’s perspective. Pricing under different seller’s risk attitudes has been studied in the
real estate literature as well. For instance, seller’s risk neutral behavior has been researched by
Arnold (1992, 1999), and Deng et al. (2012). Biswas and McHardy (2007) analyze optimal
pricing for risk averse sellers. In addition, Genesove and Mayer (2001), Anenberg (2011), and
4.2. Sequential vs simultaneous price setting 69
Bokhari and Geltner (2011) study house price determination for sellers whose risk behavior
follows the teachings of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Bruss (1998; 2003), Egozcue et al. (2013), Egozcue and Fuentes Garcı´a (2015), and Wu
and Zitikis (2017) apply a two-period model to determine optimal commodity (e.g., real estate,
computer, etc.) prices that maximize the expected revenue, or minimize the expected loss.
Some of the aforementioned works have been influenced by the two-envelope problem, and in
particular by the viewpoint put forward by McDonnell and Abbott (2009), and McDonnell et
al. (2011). Furthermore, Titman (1985) considers a two-period model to analyze the optimal
land prices when the condominium unit prices are uncertain. We also refer to Lazear (1986),
Nocke and Peitz (2007), Heidhues and Koszegi (2014), and reference therein, for additional
two-period pricing models for real estate.
4.2 Sequential vs simultaneous price setting
In this section we discuss scenarios that clarify various aspects of the problem at hand. In
particular, we shall see the difference between setting the two prices sequentially and simulta-
neously. We shall also see how the two prices are influenced by considerations such as seeking
certain gross or net profits, taking into account possibly different treatments of domestic and
foreign buyers, and so on.
We work with a discrete-time two-period economy: t = 0 and t = 1. Let X0 and X1 denote
the amounts (i.e., bidding prices) that the buyer is willing to pay for the property during the
initial (i.e., t = 0) and subsequent (i.e., t = 1) selling stages, respectively. Both X0 and X1
are random variables from the seller’s perspective, and thus we also view them in this way.
For the seller, the task is to set an appropriate price x0 for the initial selling stage, and also an
appropriate price x1 (which is usually different from x0) for the following selling stage.
It is natural to think that the seller would tend to first set x0 that would result in a desired
outcome such as the maximal expected profit during the initial selling stage, and then, if the
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sale fails, the seller would set x1 that would maximize the expected profit during the following
selling stage. As we shall illustrate below, the two prices set in this sequential manner may not
maximize the expected overall profit, and thus a sensible strategy for the seller who is not in
a rush would be to set both x0 and x1 before commencing the initial selling stage. The above
caveat ‘who is not in a rush’ is important because rushed decisions usually give rise to very
different forces at play, such as willingness to set the price x0 low enough to ensure a very
high probability of selling the property during the initial selling stage. There are of course
many other scenarios of practical interest, but in this chapter we concentrate on maximizing
the expected (gross or net) profit.
The rest of the section consists of two subsections: the first one contains preliminary facts
such as sequential and simultaneous pricing, and the second subsection discusses four scenar-
ios that clarify (and justify) the complexity of our general model that we start developing in
Section 4.3.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
Sequential price setting
Suppose that the seller decides to set the prices x0 and x1 sequentially: x0 before commencing
the initial selling stage and x1 just before the subsequent selling stage. In this case, the maximal
expected seller’s gross profit during the initial selling stage is the maximal value of the function
R0(x0) = P[X0 ≥ x0]x0, (4.1)
which is achieved at the price
x0,max = arg max
x0
R0(x0). (4.2)
Given the sequential manner of setting the prices, the maximal expected seller’s gross profit
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during the second selling stage is the maximal value of the function
R1(x1) = P[X0 < x0,max, X1 ≥ x1]x1, (4.3)
which is achieved at the price
x1,max = arg max
x1
R1(x1). (4.4)
Simultaneous price setting
The seller may decide to set the two prices x0 and x1 simultaneously, before commencing the
initial selling stage. In this case, the two expected-profit maximizing prices are
(xmax0 , x
max
1 ) = arg maxx0,x1
R(x0, x1), (4.5)
where
R(x0, x1) = P[X0 ≥ x0]x0 + P[X0 < x0, X1 ≥ x1]x1. (4.6)
Since R0(x0,max) + R1(x1,max) is equal to R(x0,max, x1,max), which cannot exceed R(xmax0 , x
max
1 ) by
the very definition of (xmax0 , x
max
1 ), the seller cannot be worse off by simultaneously setting the
prices before commencing the initial selling stage.
Note 4.2.1 The simultaneous setting of prices can be viewed as a strategic decision, whereas
setting the prices sequentially just before commencing the respective selling stages are tactical
choices, which in view of the above arguments cannot outperform the strategic (i.e., simul-
taneous) one. Deciding on which of these alternatives, and when to make them, has been a
prominent topic in the literature, particularly in enterprise risk management (e.g., Fraser &
Simkins, 2010; Louisot & Ketcham, 2014; Segal, 2011).
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Gamma distributed bidding prices
To illustrate the above arguments numerically, and to also highlight certain aspects of the gen-
eral model to be developed later in this chapter, in the following subsection we consider four
scenarios based on dependent or independent random variables of the form
X0 = a0 + G0 and X1 = a0 + G1,
where a0, which we set to 200 thousands of dollars in our numerical explorations henceforth,
is the seller’s reservation price during the initial selling stage (i.e., t = 0), which is the smallest
amount that the seller could possibly ask given the building costs and other expenses, and G0
and G1 are two (dependent or independent) gamma distributed random variables.
Although our general model is not limited to any specific price distribution, in our nu-
merical illustrative considerations, we assume that the prices follow the gamma distribution,
which is a very reasonable assumption, extensively used in the literature (see, e.g.,Hong &
Shum, 2006; Pratt, Wise & Zeckhauser, 1979; Quan & Quigley, 1991). In particular, Quan
and Quigley (1991) characterize the density function of the reservation price of a group of
self-selected buyers using this distribution. Hong and Shum (2006) apply the gamma distribu-
tion to model search costs, including time, energy and money spent on researching products,
or services, for purchasing. There are numerous cases of using the gamma distribution when
modeling insurance losses (e.g., Alai et al., 2013; Hu¨rlimann, 2001; Furman & Landsman,
2005; ).
Since different parameterizations of the gamma distribution have appeared in the litera-
ture, we note that throughout this chapter we work with the one, defined by Ga(α, β), whose
probability density function (pdf) is1
fα,β(t) =
βα
Γ(α)
tα−1e−βt, t > 0. (4.7)
1The mean of this gamma distribution is α/β and the variance is α/β2.
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We denote the corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf) by Fα,β, which for numer-
ical purposes can conveniently be expressed in terms of the lower incomplete gamma function
γ(·, ·) by the formula
Fα,β(x) =
γ(α, βx)
Γ(α)
. (4.8)
We also recall that the mean of this gamma distribution is α/β. In Figure 4.1 we have depicted
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Figure 4.1: The pdf of the price X = 200 + G depicted in solid G ∼ Ga(100, 2), dashed
G ∼ Ga(25, 0.5), dot-dashed G ∼ Ga(6.25, 0.125), and dotted G ∼ Ga(2.78, 0.056) lines.
its pdf for several parameter choices that we use in our numerical explorations later in this
chapter. The choices are such that we always have the same mean µG = α/β = 50 of G
but varying standard deviations σG: equal to 5 (solid), 10 (dashed), 20 (dot-dashed), and 30
(dotted).
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4.2.2 Scenarios
Scenario A: identical X0 and X1
Consider the case when the buyer decides on the same bidding price irrespective of the seller’s
perspective. This bidding price is random, and we denote it by X. In other words, the earlier
introduced two random variables X0 and X1 are identical, that is, both are equal to a random
variable X, which we set to be
X = a0 + G (4.9)
with the earlier defined a0 and the gamma random variable G ∼ Ga(α, β). Naturally, if the
property is not sold during the initial stage, then under Scenario A, in order to at least hope
to be successful during the subsequent stage, the seller has no alternative but to reduce the
price, and we shall see this clearly from our following mathematical considerations. We note
at the outset, however, that other scenarios to be discussed below will show the possibilities of
increasing second-stage prices and still be able to successfully sell the property.
Hence, under Scenario A, and with x0,max defined by equation (4.2) via the function R0(x0)
given by equation (4.1) with X0 = X, the function R1(x1) is given by the formula
R1(x1) = P[x1 ≤ X1 < x0,max]x1. (4.10)
Note 4.2.2 As P[X0 ≥ x0]x0 is a continuous function of x0 and P[X0 ≥ x0]x0 ≤ E[X0], the
value of x0,max exists.
Note 4.2.3 As P[x1 ≤ X1 < x0,max]x1 is a continuous function of x1 and P[x1 ≤ X1 < x0,max]x1 ≤
P[x1 ≤ X1]x1 < E[X1], the value of x1,max exists.
The (simultaneous) expected gross profit R(x0, x1), which is defined by equation (4.6) with
X0 = X1 = X, becomes
R(x0, x1) = P[X ≥ x0]x0 + P[x1 ≤ X < x0]x1. (4.11)
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We now use specification (4.9) to reduce the above formulas to more computationally
tractable ones. First, we calculate x0,max, which is the point where the function
R0(x0) =
(
1 − γ(α, β(x0 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
x0 (4.12)
achieves its maximum. Next, we calculate x1,max, which is the point where the function
R1(x1) =
γ(α, β(x0,max − a0)) − γ(α, β(x1 − a0))
Γ(α)
1{x1 ≤ x0,max}x1 (4.13)
achieves its maximum, where the indicator 1{x1 ≤ x0,max} is equal to 1 when x1 ≤ x0,max and 0
otherwise. Finally, we calculate the pair (xmax0 , x
max
1 ) that maximizes the function
R(x0, x1) =
(
1 − γ(α, β(x0 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
x0 +
γ(α, β(x0 − a0)) − γ(α, β(x1 − a0))
Γ(α)
1{x1 ≤ x0}x1. (4.14)
Note 4.2.4 As P [X0 ≥ x0] x0 ≤ E [X0] and P [x1 ≤ X1 < x0] x1 ≤ P [X1 ≥ x1] x1 ≤ E [X1], we
have
R (x0, x1) ≤ E [X0] + E [X1] .
Besides, since
lim
x0→∞
lim
x1→∞
R (x0, x1) = lim
x0→∞
P [X0 ≥ x0] x0 + lim
x0→∞
(
lim
x1→∞
P [x1 ≤ X1 < x0] x1
)
= 0,
due to Note 4.2.2 and the fact that P [x1 ≤ X1 < x0] x1 ≡ 0 whenever x1 > x0, while
lim
x1→∞
lim
x0→∞
R (x0, x1) = lim
x1→∞
(
lim
x0→∞
P [X0 ≥ x0] x0 + P [X1 ≥ x1] x1
)
= 0
due to the continuity of R (x0, x1) with respect to x0 and x1 as well as Notes 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.
Thus, for (x0, x1) → (∞,∞) from any path we have that R (x0, x1) vanishes. Therefore, there
exists a pair of prices
(
xmax0 , x
max
1
)
maximizing R (x0, x1) simultaneously.
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We report the values of the aforementioned maximal points and the respective expected
profits in Table 4.1. We note that our chosen values of α and β are such that they lead to the
α β σG R(x0,max, x1,max) x0,max x1,max R(xmax0 , x
max
1 ) x
max
0 x
max
1
100 2 5 238.3249 238.3686 232.1596 243.6800 246.8699 236.3763
25 0.5 10 229.9880 230.1152 220.5280 238.4024 244.7218 226.8302
6.25 0.125 20 217.1578 217.3732 206.2535 229.8237 241.8907 213.1633
2.78 0.056 30 207.4594 207.5638 200.5773 223.6389 240.9744 204.4544
Table 4.1: Prices and profits when X0 = X1 = X with X = a0 + G and G ∼ Ga(α, β).
same mean µG = 250 of G but different standard deviations σG (= σX). We see from the
table that we always have x0,max > x1,max and xmax0 > x
max
1 , which is natural because X0 = X1.
As we already mathematically concluded (see below equation (4.6)), the numerical values in
Table 4.1 confirm that x0,max < xmax0 and x1,max < x
max
1 , that is, setting the two selling prices
simultaneously before commencing the initial selling stage proves to be more beneficial for the
seller. Note also from the table that the values of all the four prices x0,max, xmax0 , x1,max and x
max
1
decrease when the standard deviation σG (= σX) increases.
When α = 25 and β = 0.5, the functions R0(x0) and R1(x1) as well as the surface R(x0, x1)
are depicted in Figure 4.2 and 4.3, and in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.
Scenario B: independent X0 and X1
Now we assume that the bidding prices X0 and X1 are independent, which sets us apart from
Scenario A. However, we still let the two prices follow the same distribution. Specifically,
X0 =d X and X1 =d X, (4.15)
where X = a0 +G is the same as in equation (4.9) with G ∼ Ga(α, β), and ‘=d’ denotes equality
in distribution. Hence, x0,max is defined by equation (4.2) via the function R0(x0) given by
equation (4.1) with X0 = X, and the expected profits (4.3) and (4.6) become
R1(x1) = P[X < x0,max]P[X ≥ x1]x1 (4.16)
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Figure 4.2: The functions R0(x0) of price and gross profit when X0 = a0 + G with G ∼
Ga(25, 0.5).
and
R(x0, x1) = P[X ≥ x0]x0 + P[X < x0]P[X ≥ x1]x1. (4.17)
Obviously, x0,max and x1,max must be identical because X0 and X1 follow the same distribution,
but there is of course no reason why xmax0 and x
max
1 should be identical: the clear difference
between the two will be seen from the following numerical example.
First, we see that x0,max is the same as in Scenario A but x1,max that maximizes the function
R1(x1) =
γ(α, β(x0,max − a0))
Γ(α)
(
1 − γ(α, β(x1 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
x1 (4.18)
is different from the corresponding one in Scenario A. We see these facts in Table 4.2 where
we use the same shape α and rate β parameters as in earlier Table 4.1. In Table 4.2 we have
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Figure 4.3: The functions R1(x1) of price and gross profit when X1 = a0 + G with G ∼
Ga(25, 0.5).
α β σG R(x0,max, x1,max) x0,max x1,max R(xmax0 , x
max
1 ) x
max
0 x
max
1
100 2 5 238.3595 238.3686 238.3686 244.1578 247.0367 238.3651
25 0.5 10 230.0839 230.1152 230.1152 239.2700 244.9522 230.1226
6.25 0.125 20 217.3058 217.3732 217.3732 230.9968 242.0798 217.3781
2.78 0.056 30 207.5201 207.5638 207.5638 224.4556 241.0434 207.5595
Table 4.2: Prices and gross profits when X0 and X1 are independent and follow the distribution
of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(α, β).
also reported the pairs (xmax0 , x
max
1 ) on which the maximum of the function
R(x0, x1) =
(
1 − γ(α, β(x0 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
x0 +
γ(α, β(x0 − a0))
Γ(α)
(
1 − γ(α, β(x1 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
x1 (4.19)
is achieved. Note from Table 4.1 that the values of all the four selling prices x0,max, xmax0 , x1,max
and xmax1 decrease when the standard deviation σG (= σX) increases. Note also that the bounds
x0,max < xmax0 and x
max
0 > x
max
1 hold. Furthermore, we always see the ordering x0,max < x
max
0 in
Table 4.1, but the ordering of x1,max and xmax1 seems to depend on the value of σG.
In the special case α = 25 and β = 0.5, we have depicted the functions R0(x0) and R1(x1) as
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Figure 4.4: The contour of the surface R(x0, x1) of prices and gross profits when X0 = X1 =
a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(25, 0.5).
well as the surface R(x0, x1) in Figure 4.6 and4.7, and in Figure 4.8 and 4.9.
Scenario C: X1 stochastically dominates X0
We see from previous two Tables 4.1 and 4.2 that neither sequential nor simultaneous second-
stage selling prices are higher than the corresponding first-stage prices: we always have x0,max ≥
x1,max and xmax0 ≥ xmax1 in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. In practice, however, we often observe that after
the failed initial sales, the sellers increase the prices and achieve successful results. There are
several explanations of this phenomenon, and we shall next discuss one of them, with the other
one making the contents of Scenario D below.
Namely, our first explanation is based on the assumption that, due to various reasons, buyers
are often willing to pay higher prices during the second selling stage. To illustrate this situation
numerically, we let
X0 = a0 + G0 and X1 = a0 + b1G1,
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Figure 4.5: The center area of the contour of the surface R(x0, x1) of prices and gross profits
when X0 = X1 = a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(25, 0.5).
where b1 > 0 is a constant, and G0,G1 ∼ Ga(α, β) are two independent random variables.
That is, the buyer is willing to change the bidding amount by (b1 − 1)100%. Note that b1G1 ∼
Ga(α, β/b1), which is useful when calculating. Namely, with the same x0,max as in Scenarios A
and B, we now have
R1(x1) =
γ(α, β(x0,max − a0))
Γ(α)
(
1 − γ(α, β(x1 − a0)/b1)
Γ(α)
)
x1 (4.20)
and
R(x0, x1) =
(
1 − γ(α, β(x0 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
x0 +
γ(α, β(x0 − a0))
Γ(α)
(
1 − γ(α, β(x1 − a0)/b1)
Γ(α)
)
x1, (4.21)
where x1,max maximizes the function R1(x1) and the pair (xmax0 , x
max
1 ) maximizes the surface
R(x0, x1). In Table 4.3 we have reported the numerical values of the expected gross profits
R(x0,max, x1,max) and R(xmax0 , x
max
1 ), as well as of the prices at which these maximal expected
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Figure 4.6: The functions R0(x0) of price and gross profit when X0 and X1 are independent and
follow the distribution of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(25, 0.5).
α β σG R(x0,max, x1,max) x0,max x1,max R(xmax0 , x
max
1 ) x
max
0 x
max
1
b1 = 0.5 100 2 5 238.2429 238.3686 218.6924 241.1509 243.4476 218.6442
25 0.5 10 229.9149 230.1152 214.1065 235.7860 240.6705 214.1065
6.25 0.125 20 217.1670 217.3732 207.1570 228.2490 238.4532 207.1570
2.78 0.056 30 207.4754 207.5638 202.3953 223.0999 238.8913 202.3953
b1 = 1.1 100 2 5 238.3830 238.3686 242.3547 241.4216 243.7144 220.6309
25 0.5 10 230.1187 230.1152 233.4259 240.3086 246.1226 233.3253
6.25 0.125 20 217.3363 217.3732 219.6358 231.6847 242.9417 219.6334
2.78 0.056 30 207.5313 207.5638 208.8733 224.8072 241.2413 208.8733
b1 = 2.1 100 2 5 238.6217 238.3686 282.7481 241.4216 243.7144 220.6309
25 0.5 10 230.4780 230.1152 267.7370 250.7337 252.1044 248.5686
6.25 0.125 20 217.6737 217.3732 245.0225 241.6766 253.5593 244.0345
2.78 0.056 30 207.6767 207.5638 226.2926 229.9190 247.4248 225.7422
Table 4.3: Prices and gross profits when X0 = a0 + G0 and X1 = a0 + b1G1 with independent
G0,G1 ∼ Ga(α, β) and varying parameter b1 values.
gross profits are achieved, for several values of b1.
We see from Table 4.3 that for every noted value of b1, the prices x0,max and x1,max decrease
when the standard deviation σG (= σX) increases, but the pattern of xmax0 and x
max
1 is unclear.
Note also from the table that the ordering x0,max < xmax0 always holds, but various orderings hold
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Figure 4.7: The function R1(x1) of price and gross profit when X0 and X1 are independent and
follow the distribution of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(25, 0.5).
between the second-stage prices x1,max and xmax1 . Furthermore, we see that when b1 = 0.5, we
have x0,max > x1,max and xmax0 > x
max
1 , but when b1 = 1.1 and b1 = 2.1, we have x0,max < x1,max
and xmax0 > x
max
1 .
In the special case α = 25, β = 0.5 and a = 1.1, we have depicted the functions R0(x0) and
R1(x1) as well as the surface R(x0, x1) in Figures 4.10 and 4.11, and in Figures 4.12 and 4.13.
Scenario D: cost of holding the property
Based on Scenario C, when the seller guesses that the buyer might be willing to pay a large
price during the second-stage selling stage, the price in the second stage can be set larger and
still the maximal expected gross profit achieved.
There is also another reason why the second-stage selling price can be set larger and the
seller’s goals achieved, and it is based on the fact that the seller may wish to maximize, for
example, the net profit instead of the gross profit. To simplify our illustration of this fact, we
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Figure 4.8: The contour of the surface R(x0, x1) of Prices and gross profits when X0 and X1 are
independent and follow the distribution of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(25, 0.5).
take into consideration only one deductible, which is the cost c1 of holding the property unsold,
in which case the (net) profit during the second selling stage becomes x1 − c1. Furthermore,
let the bidding prices X0 and X1 be the same as in Scenario B, that is, they are independent
and follow the same distribution as X = a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(α, β) (see (4.15)). Hence, x0,max
is the same as in Scenario B or, equivalently, as in Scenario A, that is, the selling price x0,max
is given by equation (4.2) via the same function R0(x0) as in equation (4.1). The function
R1(x1) and the surface R(x0, x1), however, need to be redefined in order to take into account the
aforementioned cost c1. Namely, we have
R1,c(x1) = P[X0 < x0,max]P[X1 ≥ x1](x1 − c1)
=
γ(α, β(x0,max − a0))
Γ(α)
(
1 − γ(α, β(x1 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
(x1 − c1),
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Figure 4.9: The center area of the contour of the surface R(x0, x1) of Prices and gross profits
when X0 and X1 are independent and follow the distribution of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(25, 0.5).
with the same x0,max as in Scenario B (or A), and
Rc(x0, x1) = P[X0 ≥ x0]x0 + P[X0 < x0,max]P[X1 ≥ x1](x1 − c1)
=
(
1 − γ(α, β(x0 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
x0 +
γ(α, β(x0 − a0))
Γ(α)
(
1 − γ(α, β(x1 − a0))
Γ(α)
)
(x1 − c1).
Thus, we have
x1,c,max = arg max
x1
R1,c(x1)
and
(xmax0,c , x
max
1,c ) = arg maxx0,x1
Rc(x0, x1),
whose numerical values for different cost c1 values are reported in Table 4.4.
We see from the table that for all specified values of c1, the sequentially set selling prices
follow the order x0,max < x1,c,max, which is the opposite of what we have seen in the previous
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Figure 4.10: The function R1(x1) of price and gross profit when X0 = a0+G0 and X1 = a0+b1G1
with independent G0,G1 ∼ Ga(α, β) and b1 = 1.1.
α β σG R(x0,max, x1,c,max) x0,max x1,c,max R(xmax0,c , x
max
1,c ) x
max
0,c x
max
1,c
c1 = 20 100 2 5 238.2367 238.3686 238.5186 241.0633 243.3410 238.5186
25 0.5 10 229.8538 230.1152 230.4159 234.9445 239.6038 230.4159
6.25 0.125 20 216.9603 217.3732 217.9019 225.1370 234.1515 217.9019
2.78 0.056 30 207.2347 207.5638 208.1217 217.2595 230.1206 208.1216
c1 = 100 100 2 5 237.7470 238.3686 239.3381 238.2509 239.9507 239.3381
25 0.5 10 228.9377 230.1152 232.1152 229.8364 233.0915 232.1152
6.25 0.125 20 215.5916 217.3732 221.1499 216.9273 222.2088 221.1500
2.78 0.056 30 206.1066 207.5638 212.1154 207.4254 212.7300 212.1154
c1 = 150 100 2 5 237.4428 238.3686 240.2109 237.6034 239.1895 240.2109
25 0.5 10 228.3730 230.1152 234.0368 228.6428 231.6018 234.0368
6.25 0.125 20 214.7622 217.3732 225.3874 215.1202 219.6026 225.3874
2.78 0.056 30 205.4343 207.5638 218.7960 205.7393 209.6705 218.7952
Table 4.4: Prices and profits for various holding cost c1 values when the bidding prices X0 and
X1 are independent and follow the distribution of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(α, β).
scenarios. In the case of simultaneously set prices, we have xmax0,c > x
max
1,c for the two smaller
costs c1 = 20 and c1 = 100, with the opposite ordering xmax0,c < x
max
1,c in the case of the cost
c1 = 150. The sequentially set selling prices in the initial stage are always smaller than the
corresponding simultaneously set prices, that is, the ordering x0,max < xmax0,c holds throughout
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Figure 4.11: The function R1(x1) of price and gross profit when X0 = a0+G0 and X1 = a0+b1G1
with independent G0,G1 ∼ Ga(α, β) and b1 = 1.1.
the entire table. The reported in Table 4.4 numerical values of the selling prices x1,c,max and
xmax1,c are very similar.
In the special case α = 25, β = 0.5 and c1 = 20, we have depicted the functions R0(x0) and
R1(x1) as well as the surface R(x0, x1) in Figures 4.14 and 4.15, and in Figures 4.16 and 4.17.
4.3 The general model
We need to further elaborate on the motivating problem, and to also introduce additional no-
tation. Hence, during the initial selling stage, which we have agreed to collapse into only one
instance t = 0, the seller keeps the property on sale. Let X0 be the price, viewed as a random
variable, that the buyer is willing to pay for the property during the initial selling stage. Let x0
be the price set by the seller, who wishes it to be such that certain (economic, financial, etc.)
goals would be achieved. Hence, unlike X0, the price x0 is not random – the seller chooses it
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Figure 4.12: The surface R(x0, x1) of prices and gross profits when X0 = a0 + G0 and X1 =
a0 + b1G1 with independent G0,G1 ∼ Ga(α, β) and b1 = 1.1.
based on the available information and the goals to be achieved. When X0 ≥ x0, the property is
sold and the seller’s profit is v0(x0), where v0 is a function, usually such that v0(p) ≤ p for all
p ≥ 0. For example,
v0(x0) = (x0 − c0)+, (4.22)
where c0 is, e.g., the property development cost evaluated during the initial selling stage. (By
definition, x+ = x when x ≥ 0, and x+ = 0 when x < 0.) If, however, X0 < x0, then the buyer
rejects the offer and makes the second (and final) attempt to buy the property at a later time,
which is generally unknown and thus treated as a random variable, which we denote by T .
Note 4.3.1 There are of course situations when T is pre-specified and thus deterministic, say
T = 1. For example, Wu and Zitikis (2017) consider a two-period economy with t = 0 standing
for the Black Friday promotion period and t = 1 for the Boxing Day promotion period.
Let XT be the amount of money that the buyer is willing to pay at time T > 0 during
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Figure 4.13: The center area of the surface R(x0, x1) of prices and gross profits when X0 =
a0 + G0 and X1 = a0 + b1G1 with independent G0,G1 ∼ Ga(α, β) and b1 = 1.1.
the second selling stage. Conditionally on T , the price XT is a random variable from the
seller’s perspective. Let x1 be the price set by the seller some time prior to commencing the
second selling stage (the price can be set as early as the time of setting the initial price x0).
Analogously to the initial decision making, if XT ≥ x1, then the property is sold and the seller’s
profit is vT (p), where vT is a value (or utility) function, perhaps different from v0, but usually
such that vT (p) ≤ p for all p ≥ 0. For example,
vT (p) = (p − cT )+,
where cT is, e.g., the costs of property development and holding it unsold at time T . We shall
provide specific details on the structure of cT later in this chapter.
For the sake of concreteness, throughout the rest of the chapter we assume that the seller
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Figure 4.14: The function R0(x0) of profit and price when the cost is c1 = 20 and the bidding
prices X0 and X1 are independent and follow the distribution of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(α, β).
wishes to determine x0 and x1 such that the overall two-stage expected profit
R(x0, x1) = P[X0 ≥ x0]v0(x0) +
∫ ∞
0
P[Xt ≥ x1, X0 < x0]vt(x1)dFT (t)
= P[X0 ≥ x0]v0(x0) + (1 − P[X0 ≥ x0]) ∫ ∞
0
P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0]vt(x1)dFT (t) (4.23)
would be maximal, where FT is the cdf of T . The seller may have various goals to achieve,
and our following considerations can be adjusted accordingly. When deriving equation (4.23),
which involves conditioning on T , we have assumed that the events Xt ≥ x1 and T = t are
independent and in this way obtained the probability
P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0].
Even though the simplifying independence assumption is natural, it can be relaxed if a ne-
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Figure 4.15: The function R1(x1) of profit and price when the cost is c1 = 20 and the bidding
prices X0 and X1 are independent and follow the distribution of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(α, β).
cessity arises, but there are also situations when this assumption is automatically satisfied. For
example, this happens in the static two-stage scenario when T always takes the same constant
value, say T = 1. We note in this regard that the chosen value 1 is just a symbolic repre-
sentation of the second selling stage, such as the Boxing Day promotion period that follows
the initial (i.e., t = 0) Black Friday promotion period (e.g., Wu & Zitikis, 2017). In this case
formula (4.23) reduces to
R(x0, x1) = P[X0 ≥ x0]v0(x0) + P[X1 ≥ x1, X0 < x0]v1(x1), (4.24)
where
v1(x1) = (x1 − c1)+. (4.25)
Henceforth, we shall make a number of other simplifying yet practically sound assumptions,
so that the technicalities would not be too complex.
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Figure 4.16: The surface R(x0, x1) of profits and prices when the cost is c1 = 20 and the bidding
prices X0 and X1 are independent and follow the distribution of a0 + G with G ∼ Ga(α, β).
4.4 The initial-stage selling probability
To assess the probabilities P[X0 ≥ x0] and P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0] on the right-hand side of
equation (4.23), we need to specify appropriate models for the random variables Xt, t ≥ 0.
Their distributions may involve population heterogeneity, as our motivating example shows,
which we take into consideration. Specifically, we assume that the population of potential
buyers consists of two groups: domestic buyers (D) permanently residing in Uruguay and
foreigners (A) wishing to make investments.
Note 4.4.1 We have reserved F for denoting cdf’s, as is usually the case in the literature, and
so use A to denote foreign buyers. This notation also reflects the fact that most of the foreign
property buyers in Punta del Este are Argentineans.
Since economic and financial considerations of the two types of buyers are usually different,
the structures of the corresponding random variables are also different. In this section we
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Figure 4.17: The center area of the surface R(x0, x1) of profits and prices when the cost is
c1 = 20 and the bidding prices X0 and X1 are independent and follow the distribution of a0 + G
with G ∼ Ga(α, β).
concentrate on the probability P[X0 ≥ x0] and thus specify the structure of X0. For this, we first
note the forces that give rise to the amount of money X0 that the buyer (domestic or foreign) is
willing to pay for the property during the initial selling stage.
In this section and throughout the rest of this chapter, background risk models will play
an important role. There are two major classes of such models: additive and multiplicative.
For applications and discussions of additive models in Economic Theory, we refer to Gollier
and Pratt (1996) and references therein, and to problems in Actuarial Science, we refer to
Furman and Landsman (2005, 2010), Tsanakas (2008), and references therein. Our current
research in subsection 4.4 is essentially based on the multiplicative model, which has been
extensively explored and utilized in the literature (see, e.g., Asimit et al., 2016; Franke et al.,
2006, 2011; Tsetlin & Winkler, 2005; references therein). It is worth noting that a number of
important parametric multiplicative models incorporate elements of both Pareto and gamma
distributions, and we refer to Asimit et al. (2016), Su (2016), and Su and Furman (2017) for
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details and further references.
4.4.1 General considerations
Consider first the population of domestic buyers. Suppose that, initially, their buying decisions
are based on individual considerations detached from all the exogenous factors, such as the
overall economic situation. Let Y0D be the amount of money (i.e., valuation) that the buyer
thinks is affordable and worthy to pay, based on the aforementioned personal considerations.
We call Y0D the endogenous domestic valuation.
Naturally, the valuation Y0D is subsequently revised into a more sophisticated and realistic
one, which we denote by X0D, taking into account various exogenous factors. We collectively
model these factors with a random variable Z0, that we call the exogenous valuation adjustment.
Let h0 be the function that couples Y0D with Z0 and gives rise to the aforementioned price X0D,
that is,
X0D = h0(Y0D,Z0). (4.26)
This is the amount of money (i.e., valuation) that the domestic buyer can afford, and is willing,
to pay for the property during the initial selling stage.
Likewise, we arrive at
X0A = h0(Y0A,Z0), (4.27)
which is the amount that the foreign buyer is willing to pay during the initial selling stage,
where Y0A is the corresponding endogenous valuation.
Note 4.4.2 Throughout this chapter we assume that the random variables Y0D, Y0A, and Z0 are
independent, which is a reasonable assumption as we argue next. Indeed, suppose that Y0D and
Y0A are dependent. This would suggest that we have not properly separated the exogenous in-
formation from the individual valuations of the domestic and foreign buyers, thus contradicting
the above description of the endogenous valuations Y0D and Y0A.
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Hence, with X0D representing the amount that the domestic buyer is willing to pay during
the initial selling stage, and with X0A representing the corresponding amount of the foreign
buyer, the valuation X0 can be expressed by the formula
X0 = ξ0X0D + (1 − ξ0)X0A, (4.28)
where ξ0 is a binary random variable taking values 1 and 0, with the event ξ0 = 1 meaning
‘domestic buyer.’ The proportion of domestic buyers depends on the value of the exogenous
valuation adjustment Z0, which naturally gives rise to the function
q0(z) = P(ξ0 = 1 | Z0 = z),
that plays a pivotal role in our subsequent considerations.
Namely, when calculating the probability P[X0 ≥ x0], we first condition on Z0, whose
cdf we denote by FZ0 , and then separate X0D from X0A by conditioning on ξ0. We obtain the
equations
P[X0 ≥ x0] =
∫
P[X0 ≥ x0 | Z0 = z]dFZ0(z)
=
∫ (
q0(z)P[X0 ≥ x0 | ξ0 = 1,Z0 = z]
+ (1 − q0(z))P[X0 ≥ x0 | ξ0 = 0,Z0 = z]
)
dFZ0(z). (4.29)
Using representation (4.28) and expressions (4.26) and (4.27) on the right-hand side of equation
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(4.29), we obtain
P[X0 ≥ x0] =
∫ (
q0(z)P[X0D ≥ x0 | ξ0 = 1,Z0 = z]
+ (1 − q0(z))P[X0A ≥ x0 | ξ0 = 0,Z0 = z]
)
dFZ0(z)
=
∫ (
q0(z)P[h0(Y0D, z) ≥ x0 | ξ0 = 1,Z0 = z]
+ (1 − q0(z))P[h0(Y0A, z) ≥ x0 | ξ0 = 0,Z0 = z]
)
dFZ0(z). (4.30)
We find it reasonable to simplify the right-hand side of equation (4.30) by first recalling that
the endogenous domestic and foreign valuations Y0D and Y0A are independent of the exogenous
valuation adjustment Z0, and then we additionally assume that the valuations Y0D and Y0A do
not depend on ξ0. All of these are justifiable assumptions from the practical point of view.
Hence, equation (4.30) simplifies into
P[X0 ≥ x0] =
∫ (
q0(z)P[h0(Y0D, z) ≥ x0] + (1 − q0(z))P[h0(Y0A, z) ≥ x0]
)
dFZ0(z). (4.31)
In the next subsection, we specialize formula (4.31) into a practically sound scenario based
on the gamma distribution, under which we subsequently explore the expected profit R(x0, x1)
numerically and graphically (Section 4.6 below).
4.4.2 Specific modelling
The gamma distribution provides a good way to model Y0D, Y0A, and Z0. In particular, we
model the endogenous domestic price Y0D using the shifted gamma distribution supported on
the intervals [a0,∞), with a0 denoting the seller’s reservation price, that is, we have the equation
Y0D = a0 + G0D,
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where G0D ∼ Ga(α0D, β0D). Assuming that the exogenous valuation adjustment Z0 is an inde-
pendent gamma random variable G0 ∼ Ga(α0, β0), the valuation X0D can then be modelled as
follows
X0D = a0 + G0DG0 = h0(Y0D,Z0),
with the coupling function
h0(y, z) = a0 + (y − a0)z. (4.32)
Analogously, starting with
Y0A = a0 + (1 + ϕ0)G0A,
where G0A ∼ Ga(α0A, β0A) is an independent gamma random variable, with the factor 1 + ϕ0
referring to the (1 + ϕ0)100% price change (e.g., increase when ϕ0 > 0) that the foreign buyers
additionally face when compared to the domestic ones, we arrive at the representation
X0A = a0 + (1 + ϕ0)G0AG0 = h0(Y0A,Z0),
with the same coupling function as in equation (4.32). We have used the same G0 as in the
‘domestic case’.
Note 4.4.3 To be in line with our earlier made assumption that foreign buyers generally offer
higher endogenous valuations than the domestic ones, in our numerical explorations we choose
the gamma parameters so that the average of G0D ∼ Ga(α0D, β0D) does not exceed the average
of G0A ∼ Ga(α0A, β0A), which is equivalent to bound
α0D
β0D
≤ α0A
β0A
. (4.33)
Bound (4.33) is satisfied for the parameter choices that we shall specify in Note 4.6.2 below.
Since the random variables G0D, G0A, and G0 are independent, formula (4.31) reduces to
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the following one:
P[X0 ≥ x0] = 1 −
∫ ∞
0
{
q0(z)Fα0D,β0D
( x0 − a0
z
)
+ (1 − q0(z))Fα0A,β0A
( x0 − a0
(1 + ϕ0)z
)}
fα0,β0(z)dz. (4.34)
It is natural to view the function q0(z) as decreasing, and such that q0(0) = 1 and q0(∞) = 0.
Thus, for example, we can model q0(z) as a survival function (i.e., 1 minus a cdf) on the interval
[0,∞). The gamma distributions serves a good model, and we thus set
q0(z) = 1 − Fγ0,δ0(z) (4.35)
in our numerical research later in the chapter 4, with appropriately chosen shape γ0 > 0 and
rate δ0 > 0 parameters.
4.5 The second-stage selling probability
In this section, we express the probability P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0] in terms of underlying quantities
at every time instance t > 0. We accomplish this task in a similar way to that for P[X0 ≥ x0] in
the previous section.
4.5.1 General considerations
We start with additional notations, mimicking the earlier ones. Firstly, we assume that the
endogenous valuations YtD and YtA as well as the exogenous valuation adjustment Zt are inde-
pendent random variables. The definition of the coupling function ht follows that in equation
(4.32) but now with at instead of a0, that is,
ht(y, z) = at + (y − at)z.
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Hence, with
XtD = ht(YtD,Zt) and XtA = ht(YtA,Zt),
we have
Xt = ξtXtD + (1 − ξt)XtA. (4.36)
Analogously to equation (4.30), we obtain
P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0] =
∫ (
qt(x0, z)P[ht(YtD, z) ≥ x1 | X0 < x0, ξt = 1,Zt = z]
+ (1 − qt(x0, z))P[ht(YtA, z) ≥ x1 | X0 < x0, ξt = 0,Zt = z]
)
dFZt(z), (4.37)
where
qt(x0, z) = P(ξt = 1 | X0 < x0,Zt = z)
is the proportion of domestic buyers at time t who did not buy during the initial selling stage
(i.e, X0 < x0).
To make our following considerations simpler, we assume that the endogenous domestic
and foreign valuations YtD and YtA are based solely on personal considerations at time t > 0, that
is, they do not depend on any past or current exogenous factors, nor on the past endogenous
factors Y0D and Y0A. In other words, we assume that the random variables YtD and YtA are
independent of X0, ξt and Zt. This simplifies equation (4.37) into the following one:
P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0]
=
∫ (
qt(x0, z)P[ht(YtD, z) ≥ x1] + (1 − qt(x0, z))P[ht(YtA, z) ≥ x1]
)
dFZt(z). (4.38)
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4.5.2 Specific modelling
Analogously to the initial selling stage, we set
YtD = at + GtD and YtA = at + (1 + ϕt)GtA,
where GtD ∼ Ga(αtD, βtD) and GtA ∼ Ga(αtA, βtA) with the factor 1 + ϕt referring to the (1 +
ϕt)100% additional amount at time t that the foreign buyer needs to pay when compared to the
domestic buyer. The exogenous valuation adjustment is
Zt = Gt ∼ Ga(αt, βt).
We assume that the three gamma random variables GtD, GtA, and Gt are independent, in which
case equation (4.38) reduces to
P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0] = 1 −
∫ ∞
0
{
qt(x0, z)FαtD,βtD
( x1 − at
z
)
+ (1 − qt(x0, z))FαtA,βtA
( x1 − at
(1 + ϕt)z
)}
fαt ,βt(z)dz. (4.39)
It is reasonable to assume that the seller’s reservation price at may change over time. For
example, it may grow at the inflation rate. Hence, in our numerical explorations we assume
that there is a constant ρ such that
at = (1 + ρt)a0,
for all t ≥ 0. This assumption reduces equation (4.39) to
P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0] = 1 −
∫ ∞
0
{
qt(x0, z)FαtD,βtD
( x1 − (1 + ρt)a0
z
)
+ (1 − qt(x0, z))FαtA,βtA
( x1 − (1 + ρt)a0
(1 + ϕt)z
)}
fα0,β0(z)dz, (4.40)
where, for the sake of simplicity, we have assumed that the distribution of the exogenous
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valuation adjustment Zt does not change with time t, that is, Zt ∼ Ga(α0, β0) for all t ≥ 0.
Finally, we introduce an appropriate model for qt(x0, z), which is more complex than that
for q0(z). We start with a few observations:
1. When x0 = a0, it is reasonable to assume that there is not anyone wishing to wait until
the second selling stage, and thus qt(a0, z) = 0 for every exogenous valuation adjustment
z.
2. When x0 = +∞, no one wishes to buy during the initial selling stage, and thus qt(+∞, z)
should look like q0(z). Hence, we let qt(+∞, z) be the survival function 1 − Ht(z) for a
cdf Ht(z) on the interval [0,∞). Just like in the case of t = 0, a good model for the cdf Ht
is the gamma cdf Fγt ,δt with shape γt > 0 and rate δt > 0 parameters, which may depend
on t.
3. It is reasonable to assume that qt(x0, z) is an increasing function of x0, because larger
prices during the initial selling stage would suggest that more domestic buyers are defer-
ring their purchases until the second selling stage.
In summary, we have arrived at the model
qt(x0, z) = Qt(x0 − a0)(1 − Ht(z)), (4.41)
where Qt is a non-negatively supported cdf. In Section 4.6 below, we work with the gamma
cdf, that is, we set
qt(x0, z) = Fηt ,θt(x0 − a0)(1 − Fγt ,δt(z))
=
γ(ηt, x0 − a0)
Γ(ηt)
(
1 − γ(γt, δtz)
Γ(γt)
)
. (4.42)
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4.6 Value functions and a numerical exploration
To make formula (4.23) actionable, in addition to the already discussed probabilities P[X0 ≥ x0]
and P[Xt ≥ x1 | X0 < x0], we need to specify appropriate models for the value functions v0(x0)
and vt(x1).
Value function v0(x0)
We already have a model for v0(x0) given by equation (4.22), but in view of our motivating
example, an adjustment to this function needs to be made. Namely, property prices in Punta
del Este, Uruguay, are predominantly in the US dollars, while property development costs are
partially in the Uruguayan pesos and partially in the US dollars. In general, the costs are mainly
due to land, design and development, materials, labor costs and subcontracts. Those that are
in the Uruguayan pesos are labor costs (i.e., salaries of Uruguayan workers) and they can, for
example, be around 30% of the structure’s costs, that is, of the total cost minus the land cost.
Therefore, we can say that, for some ν ∈ (0, 1), the percentage ν100% of the total cost is in the
Uruguayan pesos and the rest (1 − ν)100% is in the US dollars.
To express these costs into one currency, we convert the Uruguayan pesos into the US
dollars – because the prices x0 and x1 are in the latter currency – using the exchange rate
(US dollars per one Uruguayan peso) at an appropriate time instance. Namely, let ε0 be the
exchange rate during the initial selling stage (i.e., t = 0). Then equation (4.22) turns into the
following one
v0(x0) =
(
x0 − νc0,UYUε0 − (1 − ν)c0,USD)+. (4.43)
Strictly speaking, the exchange rates are unknown in advance, and thus predicted values
need to be used. It is very likely, however, that the prices x0 and x1 are set just before com-
mencing the initial selling stage, and thus the value of ε0 can be reasonably assumed known,
and thus v0 defined in equation (4.43) becomes deterministic and fully specified.
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Value function vt(x1)
The exchange rate εt at time t > 0 cannot be known beforehand, that is, at time t = 0, and we
thus treat it as a random variable. For this reason, we define vt analogously as v0, but now with
the averaging over the distribution of εt, that is, we let
vt(x1) = E
[(
x1 − νc0,UYUεt − (1 − ν)c0,USD)+]
= E
[(
x1 − νc0,UYUε0rt − (1 − ν)c0,USD)+], (4.44)
where rt = εt/ε0. In our numerical explorations, we let rt follows the geometric Brownian
motion, that is,
rt = exp{µt + σWt},
where Wt is the standard Wiener process (i.e., Brownian motion). This simple model has been
a popular example in financial engineering. Equation (4.44) becomes
vt(x1) = E
[(
x1 − νc0,UYUε0 exp{µt + σ
√
t N0,1} − (1 − ν)c0,USD)+], (4.45)
where N0,1 denotes the standard normal random variable.
We conclude this section with a note that arguments of Behavioural Economics may suggest
using the more general value functions
v0(x0) = u
(
x0 − νc0,UYUε0 − (1 − ν)c0,USD)
and
vt(x1) = E
[
u
(
x1 − νc0,UYUε0rt − (1 − ν)c0,USD)]
with some function u. Note that we have so far used u(t) = t+, which is a very simple member
in the class of so-called S -shaped functions: concave for t ≥ 0 and convex for t < 0. Reverse
S -shaped functions, which are convex for t ≥ 0 and concave for t < 0, have also been exten-
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sively employed by researchers. We also find many studies where even more complexly shaped
functions have been justified. For related discussions, we refer to, for example, Pennings and
Smidts (2003), Gillen and Markowitz (2009), Dhami (2016), and references therein.
A numerical illustration
Using formulas (4.34), (4.40), (4.42), (4.43) and (4.45) on the right-hand side of equation
(4.23), and with the parameter choices specified below, we obtain an expression for the ex-
pected profit R(x0, x1) whose maximum with respect to x0 and x1 we want to find. Alongside
the surface R(x0, x1) and the point (pmax0 , p
max
1 ) where it achieves its maximum, in Figure 4.18
and 4.19, and in Figure 4.20 and 4.21 we have also depicted the profit functions R0(x0) and
R1(x1).
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Figure 4.18: The function R0(x0) of profit and price under the parameter specifications in Notes
4.6.1–4.6.4.
Next are the parameter choices that we have used in our numerical and graphical explo-
rations, summarized in the four panels of Figure 4.18 and 4.21, and subsequently detailed in
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Figure 4.19: The function R1(x1) of profit and price under the parameter specifications in Notes
4.6.1–4.6.4.
Figures from Figure 4.22 to Figure 4.24. We note that the parameter choices have arisen from
our statistical analyses of (proprietary) data sets, as well as from our Economic Theory based
considerations.
Note 4.6.1 We assume T ∼ Ga(α∗, β∗) and set the following parameter values:
• α∗ = 4 and β∗ = 4
Note 4.6.2 These are the specific parameter choices pertaining to the model of Section 4.4.2:
• a0 = 200
• α0D = 20 and β0D = 0.6
• α0A = 30 and β0A = 0.4
• α0 = β0 = 4
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Figure 4.20: The surface R(x0, x1) of profits and prices under the parameter specifications in
Notes 4.6.1–4.6.4.
• ϕ0 = 0.2
• γ0 = 10 and δ0 = 0.1
Note 4.6.3 These are the specific parameter choices pertaining to the model of Section 4.5.2:
• at = 200 (= a0)
• ϕt = 0.2
• ρ = 0.1
• αtD = 20 (= α0D) and βtD = 0.6 (= β0D)
• αtA = 30 (= α0A) and βtA = 0.4 (= β0A)
• αt = βt = 4 (= α0 = β0)
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Figure 4.21: The center area of the surface R(x0, x1) of profits and prices under the parameter
specifications in Notes 4.6.1–4.6.4.
• ηt = 8 and θt = 1
• γt = 10 and δt = 0.1
Note 4.6.4 These are the specific parameter choices pertaining to the value function vt(x1)
discussed in Section 4.6:
• ν = 0.3
• c0,UYUε0 = 150 and c0,USD = 150
• µ = 0 and σ = 1
The proposed model has been developed to facilitate well-informed decisions, and the real-
life example has guided us in every step of the model development. The model has, inevitably,
turned out to be complex. Hence, at this initial stage of our exploration, we have prioritized
certain aspects of the research according to their relevance in terms of policy implications, in
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order to keep considerations within reasonable space limits. The timing of price setting has
perhaps been the most significant aspect that is affecting all the other ones. The dependence
between the two-stage pricing decisions and the influence of the systematic (or background)
risk has been among the other important aspects. The exchange rate fluctuations, though very
important, have nevertheless been given a lesser attention in the present chapter, due to a jus-
tifiable reason. Namely, a detailed exploration of this aspect with due mathematical care of its
various issues such as change points, heteroscedasticity, and other non-linear structures man-
ifesting naturally in financial stochastic models would require considerable space. Our use of
the simple geometric Browning motion, instead of a more complex and realistic process, has
also been influenced by space considerations. Nevertheless, to give an initial idea about the
influence of the mean µ and the volatility σ, we have produced a set of graphs in Figures from
Figure 4.23 to Figure 4.24.
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(a) µ = 0 and σ = 0.5.
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(b) µ = 0 and σ = 1.
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(c) µ = 0 and σ = 2.
P0
P 1
200 205 210 215 220
20
0
20
5
21
0
21
5
22
0
(d) µ = 0 and σ = 3.
Figure 4.22: Π(p0, p1) for µ = 0 and various values of σ.
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(a) µ = 0.5 and σ = 0.5.
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(b) µ = 0.5 and σ = 1.
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(c) µ = 0.5 and σ = 2.
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(d) µ = 0.5 and σ = 3.
Figure 4.23: Π(p0, p1) for µ = 0.5 and various values of σ.
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(a) µ = 1 and σ = 0.5.
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(b) µ = 1 and σ = 1.
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(c) µ = 1 and σ = 2.
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(d) µ = 1 and σ = 3.
Figure 4.24: Π(p0, p1) for µ = 1 and various values of σ.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and future works
5.1 Conclusions
The thesis discusses optimal strategies and decisions in a two-period economy scenario, and
we propose general frameworks to involve a trade-off between the the present (current period)
benefits and the benefits in the future (next period). In this thesis, following the logic of the
two-envelope problem and inspired by the pioneer works of McDonnell and Abbott (2009),
McDonnell et al. (2011) and Egozcue et. al. (2013), we construct the two-period time horizon
economic models of optimal strategies and decisions to deal with the realistic problems.
In the case of buying laptop whether in Black Friday, or Boxing day, we have proposed the
general two-period optimal strategies to make decisions which minimize the expected buying
price from the buyers perspective. In this model, we have tackled this topic in the setup that
concerns shoppers facing two price-discount periods and needing a strategy for making ben-
eficial (for them) decisions. Incorporating the market structure theory of economics, we have
applied the third-degree price discrimination theory to describe the distribution of price vari-
ables in two stages respectively. Guided by these economic theories and also, some rigorous
probabilistic considerations, we have developed a practically sound model for making such de-
cisions. In particular, we have shown how to derive, analyze, and use strategy functions, which
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not only delineate the acceptance and rejection regions for the first-come offers but also tell us
how confident we can be when making such decisions.
In the cases of selling real estate, we have proposed the general two-period pricing mod-
els and explored various pricing strategies from the seller’s perspective. The model takes into
account such practical considerations as the facts that the buyer’s valuations, which are ran-
dom from the seller’s perspective, in the two periods may or may not be independent, may
or may not follow the same distribution, and so on. We have seen in particular that the
seller’s simultaneous-pricing strategies yield higher expected revenues than the sequential-
pricing strategies. Our general model allows for the possibility of commodity costs being
denominated in different currencies, and thus being impacted by currency exchange-rate move-
ments. The model also takes into accounts various endogenous and exogenous factors, such
as seller’s and buyer’s considerations, general economic conditions, different seller’s utility
or value functions. We have illustrated our theoretical findings both numerically and graphi-
cally, using appropriately constructed multiplicative background models that quickly take into
account various specific elements of the motivating problem.
5.2 Future works
This thesis provides some insights related to the application of the two-envelope paradox
framework on the general decision-making process from the perspectives of both purchasing
and selling. However, the distributional assumptions of the prices are straightforward. Hence
one possible future work is to generalize these assumptions. For instance, when considering
a discounted price (having bounded support), we could assume that the price offered by the
seller has a generalized Beta distribution of the second kind (GB2). More details about the
GB2 distribution could be found in textbooks such as Section 6.1 of Kleiber and Kotz (2003).
As a distribution widely used in modeling risks and prices, the GB2 distribution is more flex-
ible than Beta distribution and thus may provide more accurate results if the parameters are
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estimated from real data. Besides, the truncated gamma distribution used by Quan and Quigley
(1991) might be another choice for modeling the discounted price. Since this distribution is
less related to the Beta distribution than the GB2 distribution, if similar results hold in this
case then our method will seem to be useful for a broader range of distributions that could be
employed for modeling prices.
Similarly, when considering the offered prices of underlying assets such as real estates, the
distribution of the offered prices could be generalized in several different ways. For instance,
the offered prices could be assumed to follow the generalized gamma distribution (Kleiber and
Kotz, 2003, Section 5.1), which are usually used for modeling the incomes. Other choices may
include heavy tail distributions such as log-normal distribution or Pareto distribution if there is
a booming market for assets like real estate.
After studying the decision-making problems with specific distributions based on our gen-
eralized two-envelope paradox framework, a natural question is to identify certain classes of
distributions which may still lead to the similar results. For prices with a bounded-support,
we might be interested in the difference between the results by modeling the prices using a
“flatter” distribution (by flatter we mean the distribution has huge variance and similar to the
uniform distribution) or a “steeper” distribution. For prices without an upper bound, we might
be interested in the difference between the results by modeling the prices using a heavy-tailed
distribution and a light-tailed distribution, which correspond to a booming and a falling market
of certain assets, respectively.
Besides of generalizing the distributional assumptions of prices, another important potential
work is to apply our generalized two-envelope framework on multi-period decision processes
such as the American option. Assume an investor holds an American option, he/she has to
decide whether to exercise the option at the end of each period. If the option is not exercised,
the investor will keep making decisions until he/she decides to use it or the maturity date
of the option. The assumptions that required by the framework may include the martingale
assumption (the return of the underlying asset is a martingale), AR(1) assumptions (the return
114 Chapter 5. Conclusions and future works
of the underlying asset is an AR(1) time series), or other more complex hypotheses.
Furthermore, in our analysis there is only one decision-maker who is considered and a
right decision is made depending on the curves we obtained. In fact, this piece of information
is much more crucial to the counterparty. If the seller knows the rules of decision-making of
the buyer, there might be a strategic adjustment on how to determine the discounted prices on
traditional holidays. Similarly, if the buyers of real estates know the rule of decision-making
of the seller, they will adjust their offered prices accordingly. Therefore, we may expect a
significant gaming problem between buyers and sellers under our generalized two-envelope
framework.
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